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# West Europe Report

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22 October 1985

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

CVP'S DEHAENE ON NEGOTIATIONS, POLICIES OF NEXT GOVERNMENT

Brussels LE SOIR in French 10 Sep 85 p 2

[Interview with Jean-Luc Dehaene, minister of social affairs and institutional reform, by Guy Depas and Guy Duplat: "Dehaene: 'We Must Pursue the Current Policy, but with New Emphases...'" ; date and place not given]

[Text] "Jean-Luc Dehaene, a cobblestone in the rue de la Loi." This electoral slogan of the CVP [Social Christian Party (Flemish)] strongman within the Martens-Gol team is revealing for this bulldozer of our politics. In terms of economic or community problems, the minister of social affairs and institutional reform does not hesitate to stir things up a bit. Is he for all that the Flemish nationalist or the man of the CSC [Confederation of Christian Trade Unions] he is sometimes presented as? He seemed very different in the interview he gave us. Even though he did not let go of a single gram of ballast concerning the limits of Brussels or the community problem in general, he rejected any kind of Flemish nationalist howling and any nationalist claims. Economic recovery must remain a priority for another 4 years.

Cautious, he did not reject the socialists. Who knows what the results of the elections will be? But there would be no question of changing course. Only to include "new emphases." And that is where the man seems the most amazing. He pleads for modesty among politicians who do not have a ready made solution to the crisis. He regrets the illusions given to the people by this government by letting them think that it would be enough to tighten one's belt to get out of it. The crisis is in reality a shift toward another society and politicians must be content to create a good framework which promotes this shift and opens tracks.

Dehaene, who is passionately interested in the third wave, data processing and the future, sees in this shift a task which goes beyond the old cleavages of the right and the left. Doesn't this modesty of Jean-Luc Dehaene remind one of the modernism of someone like Fabius in France?

[Question] You were very bitter following your defeat on the issue of the communitarization of education...

[Answer] That was not bitterness, but rather disappointment. Since July something has been broken in the functioning of the government. Apparently, not all of us were immune to electoral fever and what we were able to do during three and a half years, that is to say to govern without being controlled from a distance by the parties, was no longer possible in the last straight line. Based on the discreet contacts I had in July, I thought that we would be able to find a solution for Article 59b. We were not far away from it. But the public positions taken in August have complicated everything.

[Question] Was that crisis a premeditated maneuver?

[Answer] If it was premeditated, I'm not sure that it will be profitable.

[Question] Why didn't the CVP provoke the resignation of the government in order to show that it was fighting to the end for 59b?

[Answer] It is true that we believe that the Belgian institutions have not yet found their balance and that they still need to evolve. That is why we wanted to include this article in the constitutional revision statement. But in spite of that, the government's economic and social policy had to remain a priority. A fall of the government based on the statement of revision would have brought the community element back to the fore and could perhaps have conditioned the kind of future coalition we will have. Which we didn't want.

#### Governing for Four Years

[Question] But doesn't putting the community element on ice present the risk of seeing it explode?

[Answer] It has never been put on ice. Mr Gol and myself have implemented the laws of 1980. A great many people underestimate the differences which exist between reforms on paper and their implementation in the field. We have also solved eminently community problems, such as that of the national sectors. In short, we didn't dodge those issues but tried to keep them from mortgaging the economic priorities.

[Question] Will that remain your philosophy during the next legislative session?

[Answer] The priority must remain the economic and social areas. And those who are insinuating that the next legislative session could be a short one because of the lack of a constitutional revision statement are seriously mistaken. Like Martens, I believe that the country needs stability like it needs bread. The next government will have to govern for 4 years.

But if the priority remains economic, we will still have to live with our community problems. It is an illusion to think that they will disappear. That is to play ostrich. In order to solve them, I would have preferred the next

Chambers to be constituent. That was not possible. This will be a handicap which will limit the search for solutions but not block them. We could still modify the laws of 1980, tackle the problems of Brussels or concern ourselves with education.

#### One Flemish Student Equals One Walloon Student

[Question] What will the CVP demands be at the time the next government is set up?

[Answer] We will ask for a review of the allocation of financial resources in education between the two communities. It will have to be done in function of the number of students. And I don't see how Mr Deprez could criticize the idea that one Walloon student equals one Flemish student.

[Question] Will this review of resources also affect the universities and science policy?

[Answer] Yes. Because it is clear that a great deal needs to be straightened out in terms of university credits and science policy. We will also, from the very beginning, have to talk about the constitutional review statement for 1989, because the PSC [Social Christian Party (Walloon)] has reproached us for not having provided it in the government declaration. We will also have to think about the ways to improve the functioning of our institutions. I would like for the Center for the Study of State Reform to be able to continue its activities and for the opposition to participate in it. Finally, I don't exclude the possibility that we may have to solve some community related problems so that they will not mortgage the future of the government as did the contract to renovate the telephone exchanges of the RTT [Telegraph and Telephone Administration], for example.

[Question] And what about the Limburg mines?

[Answer] There will be several problems...

[Question] Will the Happart affair be settled?

[Answer] The legal procedure is following its course...

[Question] No big community rounds?

[Answer] No. It will be necessary quickly to have a government which is active in the economic and social areas. But we will be able to define procedures to settle certain community issues.

[Question] Including Brussels?

[Answer] The climate in Brussels is changing. I believe that during the next legislative session we will be able to discuss this problem in a totally different frame of mind because the role of Brussels as capital of the country and of Europe is getting the upper hand over the idea of Brussels as a



full-fledged region. That is positive. The two communities must be equally associated in its management. There is only one point we will not be able to discuss and that is territorial limits. Aside from that, there is room for openings and for creativity. We, on the Flemish speaking side, are ready for that because we are convinced that the current situation cannot last.

[Question] What coalition would you like to see after the elections?

[Answer] Let us not talk about coalitions because they will depend on the votes of the electorate. But there will be no question of doing the opposite of what has been done during this legislative session: when we came to power in 1981, Belgium was the sick man of Europe; today we are often mentioned as an example. Hence, we must pursue the current policy while giving it new emphases in function of the results already obtained.

#### Too Many Illusions

[Question] New emphases?

[Answer] Yes. I would like to step back a little and distinguish three periods in the crisis. From 1974 until 1981, we lived as if there were no crisis and as if things could return to the way they were before. In 1981, there was an awakening. And it was all the more brutal because it was more belated. The government policy and the shock of the devaluation demonstrated well to everybody that it was no longer possible to go on as if nothing was going on. But we allowed another illusion to grow, to the effect that it would be enough to restore the main economic balances to return to the good old days. That it would be sufficient to tighten one's belt to obtain results. We spoke in terms which were not very nuanced and which did not take into account the international constraints in which a small country like ours is immersed. We stayed in the lines of politicians of the sixties and seventies, who believed that they were the ones who created employment and determined the economic cycle. At that time, the economy was sailing before the wind. The politicians took the train in motion and invented industrial policies and expansion laws. They quickly confused the train with the engineer. Public opinion was deceived. It still believes today that the politicians have the solution to the crisis in their hands. And if I have learned anything in this administration, it is that you don't create jobs through laws.

On the other hand, we can create a framework, promote a climate which arouses dynamism. The ministers must remain modest. They are neither all-powerful nor powerless. They can open up opportunities which others must use. If the latter do not set things in motion, they will not work.

#### Toward New Society

[Question] Have the employers made good use of your openings?

[Answer] The cash problems experienced by our enterprises were underestimated. But there is also a problem of management in our country, which is not new. Those who carried out our expansion in the sixties were often foreign managers.

There are things to be done in terms of taking initiatives or of conquering new markets.

[Question] And what about the third period in the crisis?

[Answer] Our main balances are on the road to recovery. That was a necessity, but it is not enough to get us out of the crisis, because this crisis is a real shift toward a new society which we have trouble perceiving. Politics must allow this shift and should not block the change. We are going toward a more diversified, less anonymous society, with greater responsibilities for everyone, with forms of solidarity which are more directly experienced and less anonymous.

[Question] Are you preaching flexibility and deregulation?

[Answer] Those are ideologies. Let us rather search for a pragmatic approach in which the model submits to society, and not vice versa. This government has already started this policy by granting more autonomy to the universities, the municipalities and the parastatal organizations. Mr Hansenne and myself have freed choices in labor. There is even talk of a revolution of the chosen time which will be one of tomorrow's major gains. We will have to create opportunities, not impose anything.

Highways of Communication

[Question] Including in matters of salaries?

[Answer] In 1986, the problem of revenue formation will be at the center of concern. The social partners must try to develop an agreement. I think that the rather rigid framework of the last 4 years will not have to be maintained, but it will be necessary to avoid compromising the general balances.

[Question] What do you think of the selective recovery advocated by the socialists?

[Answer] We must keep our budgetary situation in mind. Hence, I would rather talk of reorienting the resources at our disposal. To shift, for example, credits from Public Works to Telecommunications. We must construct the highways of communication as we constructed the highways of the sixties.

[Question] What do you think of the economic programs of the PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)] and the SP [Socialist Party (Flemish)]?

[Answer] I have noticed that there is a difference in language between those two parties. When I look at their program, I see that it would be very difficult to make them compatible with the pursuit of the current recovery policy. We will have to explain that to the voters, because they would greatly facilitate matters if they allowed us to start up again with the same partners.

[Question] If that were not possible, do you then envision an asymmetrical government with the PS and without the SP?

[Answer] One should never say never or always... But if we want to maintain the unity of the country, that would not be very desirable!

[Question] Doesn't Francois Perin propose you as the future prime minister of a coalition with the socialists?

[Answer] Francois Perin follows things from a great distance.

[Question] What is your personal objective?

[Answer] My wish would be to continue for another 4 years in my current position. Because the complexity of the problems there is such that I am only now discovering certain things to be done. There are, for example, many steps left to take to manage the increased ageing of our population.

[Question] Do you sometimes dissociate yourself from the CVP?

[Answer] One of the significant aspects of this administration, which should be continued later on, is to have chosen the strong arms of the parties as ministers. We were able to take our own responsibilities. Like Martens, I believe that if the ministers, in a country which no longer has national parties, no longer have the courage to take their responsibilities and blindly follow their party, with all the community complications this would imply, it would be the beginning of the end.

[Question] Are you a candidate to succeed Martens?

[Answer] That question is not current.

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

POLL SHOWS INDECISION ON PART OF ELECTORATE

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 12 Sep 85 p 1

[Article by Guy Daloze and Andre Mean]

[Text] Our political barometer reflects indecision--  
and stability?

This is the last opinion poll (made public...) before the elections! Parliament made a decision to this effect: public opinion polls can no longer be published within a month before an election. That is why our quarterly barometer of public opinion, LA LIBRE BELGIQUE Marketing Unit, is being published this Thursday, 12 September, rather than at the end of the month....

Conducted last week--the week of the dissolution of the Chambers and the controversies over revision of the Constitution and communitarization of education--our poll consists of 10 interesting topics at the time the electoral campaign is getting started.

1. Four Walloons out of 10 have not yet decided what their vote will be on 13 October, and the same is true of 3 Brussels voters out of 10. The indecision of the French-speaking electorate is, therefore, manifest, unlike the Flemish voters who for the most part seem to have already made up their minds. The campaign--and the arguments developed by the parties--will, therefore, be essential, if not decisive; and the situation is far from being "set in cement" as regards the French-speaking electorate.
2. The 59 bis affair [proposed law regarding communitarization of education] is not influencing the voter, in the present situation in any case. The rejection of the PSC [Social Christian Party] is not being translated into a spectacular gain for the party (plus 0.5), while the CVP [Social Christian Party] is not being "punished" by its members (it is continuing to recover votes while the Volksunie remains stationary).
3. The PVV [Party of Liberty and Progress] continues to lag behind in the majority (because of a massive shift to the CVP?) which tomorrow will produce the possibility of accompanying the outgoing coalition. On the other hand, the



other three components of the majority are gaining steadily according to several polls and are gradually regaining their 1981 numbers. Clearly, the CVP is again becoming the number one party in Flanders. However, let us not overlook the socialists: the PS [Socialist Party] in Wallonia is moving up to the 38-percent level and, even if it loses ground, the PS has strength figures 9 percentage points higher than those of preceding legislatures.

4. The Ecologists have been experiencing a continuing rise on the barometer since spring, and this in the country's three regions, while improving considerably their 1981 strength. A certain amount of disaffection? The FDF [Francophone Democratic Front], on the other hand is moribund; the Wallonian parties have disappeared, and the UDRT, [Democratic Union for the Respect of Work], an exclusively Brussels' phenomenon, is declining.

5. Many of the results recorded are very close to those of the 1984 European elections: were the most recent results a general repetition?

6. Mr Martens is a big hit in the country's three regions and seems more than ever the man whom all Belgians will elect to head the next government. In Flanders, Martens has once again become the "number one" man ahead of Mr Van Miert; he is number one in Brussels, and in Wallonia the prime minister has improved his rating by 6 percentage points (from 2 percentage points in Brussels). In the southern part of the country, he is only 1 percentage point behind Guy Spitaels who, by the skin of his teeth, is retaining his title of "Mister Wallonia." Is it Martens' intention to keep the government in place until the end [to take advantage of] his two televised "clips" which are the reason for the prime minister's spectacular gain? Everyone can appreciate this.

7. Mr Gol is paying for [the] Heysel [affair] and there is general agreement in the country's three regions that the liberal vice prime minister should not have resigned. Gol has lost 3 percentage points in Wallonia as in Brussels. The PRL [Liberal Reform Party], as a party, however, does not seem to be suffering from Gol's loss of prestige. In any event, if we were to refer to the poll of July 1985....

8. Mr Deprez is gaining spectacularly in Wallonia but even though his popularity has increased by 8 percentage points at one fell swoop, it appears that this is principally due, as in other cases, to the phenomenon of more pronounced notoriety than to approval of his policy with regard to the communitarization of education. The PSC is making only very modest gains.

9. Mr Simonet is soaring in Brussels and has gained 15 percentage points compared to the summer on our barometer of popularity. However, he is behind Martens and Gol, two men who are not candidates in the capital.

10. An asymmetric government appeals to no one: the Walloons reject it by a very large majority; the Flemish are a little bit more in favor of it; and the people of Brussels are undecided but broadly negative even so.

POLITICAL

DENMARK

NEW SDP PROGRAM SEEN ISOLATING PARTY FURTHER IN OPPOSITION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 13-19 Sep 85 p 2

[Commentary by Solveig Rødsgaard]

[Text] With the new program for a Social Democratic government, the Social Democratic Party has pushed the Radical Liberal Party further aside. And at the same time as the party has to demonstrate its ability to take action, it spends its energy fighting the Socialist People's Party.

"I certainly should not like to see a government carry through this program." With this sharp statement on the new Social Democratic government program, the Radical Liberal chairman, Niels Helveg Petersen, destroys all hopes on the part of the Social Democrats that the Radical Liberals will help the Social Democratic Party regain its government position. That is why the Social Democratic Party and its party chairman, Anker Jørgensen, are today more isolated than ever before.

The isolation is partly self-inflicted and partly desired. The Social Democratic Party is bound to find itself isolated in relation to the Radical Liberals, who in the economic policy area adhere firmly to cooperation with the government, and the party has chosen to isolate itself from the increasingly stronger Socialist People's Party, which is pressing for the establishment of a formalized cooperation between the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party. Gert Petersen, party chairman of the Socialist People's Party, tells WEEKENDAVISEN that he finds the leadership of the Social Democratic Party "incapable of taking action."

The Social Democratic appeal to the Radical Liberal Party is often repeated, and as recently as at the annual congress of the Social Democratic Party, held last weekend, several leading Social Democrats again reached out for the small party with the big influence. The Radical Liberals, however, do not want to buy the Social Democratic policy, nor the new wall newspaper

which, under the heading "Denmark for the Entire People," indicates the things which a Social Democratic government will carry through in 1986-90.

The platform has been prepared by the deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Svend Auken, with the assistance of the chief economist of the Federation of Trade Unions, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, and it is an updating and extension of the Social Democratic hitherto political and economic policy program "The Solidary Road, the Economic Policy of the Social Democratic Party in 1984-89." The program was presented at the annual congress of the Social Democratic Party, and the 103 district organizations and 14 county organizations will market "Denmark for the Entire People" in the course of the coming months in cooperation with the trade union associations and trade unions. Each district organization will receive 30,000 kroner for activities, and the money comes from the Federation of Trade Unions. However, it is somewhat harder to obtain political assistance from other parties.

#### Radical Liberal Evaluation

Niels Helveg Petersen tells WEEKENDAVISEN that the Radical Liberals are unable to support the program because "it is too vague and too weak."

He goes on to say: "The program is a step backwards compared to 'The Solidary Road,' as far as incomes policy is concerned, because the Social Democratic Party is yielding and easing its position. They are no longer talking about improving the competitiveness via the incomes policy, they are now talking about securing an incomes development on a par with incomes developments abroad. That is, of course, incredibly unclear. For which foreign country are they referring to? Is it West Germany, Italy, Spain, Great Britain or Sweden? That is, indeed, a very vague way of putting it, and it a serious matter for the Social Democrats to be uncertain when it comes to their objectives.

On the other hand, there are no uncertainties when it comes to improvements. In his preface to the program, Anker Jørgensen writes that they do not want to make any glittering promises, but that is actually what the party is doing. Fully implemented, the program will involve very considerable increases in public expenditures. It is repeated throughout the program--though no figures are given--that there are possibilities of expanding the expenditures of the public sector pari passu with the growth of the economy. That is wrong. That possibility does not exist. We have to use the economic growth to attack the balance of payments deficit and the deficit on the state finances as well as for investments. Actually, the program advocates transferring resources from their very active employment within the industrial sector to the public sector. The entire trend of the program is a weaker incomes policy and a weaker expenditure policy. In my opinion, that will invariably lead to a higher interest level, a lower rate of investment within the private sector and thus a declining rate of employment within the private sector."

#### Ability to Govern the Country

On the Social Democratic Party's ability to govern the country, Niels Helveg Petersen says:

"I find it dangerous for the Social Democratic Party to make too heavy demands on developments in the economic policy. I do not find that the program as a whole is a suitable basis for a government, and I should not like to see a government carry through this program. In so doing, they would squander a great deal of what, after all, has been achieved in the course of the last 3 years. And if it is up to us, there will be no premature election. I find that it will be the best thing for all parties that the electoral period continues till it is over. That is best for the country."

On the problems within the Social Democratic Party, Niels Helveg Petersen says that the real problem may not be within the leadership:

"I actually believe that it is, to a large extent, a question of an ideological problem. The Social Democratic Party has always found it very difficult tackling the big problems which have to be solved. It is ideologically contrary to some of their most ingrained spinal reflexes. The Social Democrats have for decades had the idea that prosperity and welfare would be achieved by way of an expansion of the public sector, and the party finds it difficult to abandon that idea. All of the pressures put on the Social Democratic Party--from the trade unions, from non-profit housing companies, etc.--cause the party to make political decisions which tax the public sector, and that is dangerous in a situation where we still have got a considerable balance of payments deficit and a large deficit on our state finances."

#### Evaluation by Socialist People's Party

The chairman of the Socialist People's Party, Gert Petersen, finds that the Social Democratic program "Denmark for the Entire People" contains features which show progress compared to previous programs, especially in the area of the environment.

"To me, there is no doubt that there are a number of areas where the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party have similar viewpoints, although we intend to go farther and proceed more rapidly in certain areas than the Social Democrats. However, the decisive thing is: with whom do the Social Democrats want to carry it through. With the Conservatives? It is not long since the prime minister said that it would be a disaster if the Social Democratic program would be carried through. I find it hard to imagine that it might be the Radical Liberals in view of the fact that the Radical Liberal Party has supported the economic policy pursued by Schluter. That is why the Social Democratic Party will, first and foremost, have to choose the left of the Folketing if the party is to have a chance of carrying through just the main items of its program. However, the Social Democrats have entirely refused to discuss this at their annual congress.

Whether the Social Democratic Party is capable of governing the country now? Well, if it manages to get the majority of the votes, I assume it would. But I would find the party a great deal more capable of governing the country if it prepared a clear political strategy and presented it and had it approved by the competent assemblies. The wisest and best thing for the Social Democrats to do would, of course, be to cooperate with the left wing. And it



weakens them that they have no clear strategy. The uncertainty about the Social Democratic Party is almost the worst thing of it all."

#### Incapable of Taking Action

Gert Petersen says that he does not believe that the Social Democratic leadership has given up any actual cooperation with the Socialist People's Party:

"The only thing is that they dare not discuss it. They are incapable of taking action. At their annual congress, they kept their discussions secret in all areas. Also in the security policy area, and that is a very big handicap. It is possible that our national congresses are rather open from a classical political point of view, but that means that once something has been adopted, it is something to which the leadership of the party and the party members feel reasonably committed. I cannot see what the Social Democratic leadership would feel obligated by beyond the program itself. And it may, of course, easily become rather academic if they fail to deal with the questions how to implement their program and with whom they have to ally themselves to achieve the necessary majority."

Gert Petersen, incidentally, finds the Social Democratic program reasonable.

"And I should like to stress that we do not tell ourselves or others that we shall be able to repair the damage done by Schluter overnight, and I do not want for people to say that we believe that we can simply spend the money freely. We are well aware of the fact that the economy is in a fairly poor shape. However, I believe that it would be useful to have some talks between the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party, and our invitation to the Social Democrats is an open one."

#### The Program

"Denmark for the Entire People" is a program of nine items, and the economic prerequisites for the program are largely the same as for "The Solidary Road." The program assumes an annual growth rate in the national product of 3 percent and a declining real interest rate in Denmark and abroad. The labor force is assumed to continue to grow at a rate of 15,000-20,000 persons, and a considerable increase in the production per work hour of upwards of 3.5 percent annually is expected within the private urban sector. It is, at the same time, assumed that the work week will be reduced by a couple of percent annually. The Social Democrats also assume that the deficit on the state finances will approach the zero point around the year 1990, and that the balance of payments will be nearly in equilibrium by 1990.

Under the program, the Social Democratic Party's immediate "measures to combat economic maladjustments" will be abolition of reimbursement by employees of the first day of sick leave, guarantee of educational opportunities for the unemployed, repeal of the regulation under the welfare act to reduce welfare payments after a person has been 9 months on welfare, adjustment of severance pay rates and daily unemployment benefit rates by 5 percent, and subsequently,

pari passu with wage developments, tightening of the hydrocarbon tax and repeal of the legislation governing reduced employer's dues.

Another point concerns working hours and incomes policy. Here, the new Social Democratic government will initiate tripartite negotiations with the parties of the labor market well before the renewal of the collective agreements in 1987. The incomes policy arrived at through negotiations will have to ensure an incomes development "which corresponds to cost developments abroad." There must be an even wage development among employees within the public and private sectors. The work week will be reduced to 35 hours by the end of 1990. Compensations will be kept within the frameworks of the new collective agreements.

Within the housing sector, the party will, among other things, ensure a rate of construction of 12,000 non-profit housing units annually and an expansion concurrently with the need for non-profit housing, and within the area of youth, the Social Democrats want to introduce an actual education pay, half of which will have to be paid back when the earnings exceed the highest unemployment benefit payments. In the area of pensions, a labor market pension reform will be carried through, and pensioners will be entitled to a partial severance pay. "Green woods, music and soccer" is the last item of the platform, and the Social Democratic Party intends here to carry through, among other things, a "radical reorganization of the production and cultivation methods employed in agriculture" to fight nitrate pollution, and there will be increased subsidies for cultural activities and the sports.

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

GREENS, SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY ADVANCE IN POLL

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 16 Sep 85 p 2

[Text] Copenhagen: Clear shift to left and four seats in the Folketing for the Greens.

These are the main trends of the poll recently carried through by OBSERVA for MORGENAVISEN JYLLANDSPOSTEN. The figures show that if an election would have taken place on 9 September, the Schluter government would have lost its majority. Both the Liberal Party and the party supporting the government, the Radical Liberal Party, will lose 1 percent, and since the Conservatives no longer score any gains, the majority is lost.

The Social Democratic Party will more or less hold on to its 31 percent, and as the Socialist People's Party, at the same time, scores considerable gains, the two blocs are today in equilibrium. Even with the support of the Progressive Party, the nonsocialist bloc has only 48 percent of the vote, the same percentage as the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Left Socialist Party. The small Greens Party, therefore, is able to assume a central role directly.

The Greens will get 2 percent of the vote, enough for four seats. It will be decisive in a future government formation whom these four members of the Folketing will support.

According to the poll carried out by OBSERVA, the percentage distribution of the votes were as follows, the figures from the most recent poll being shown in the first column, and the figures from the elections to the Folketing in January of 1984 appearing in the second column:

Social Democratic Party	31 - 31.6	Center Democrats	4 - 4.6
Radical Liberal Party	4 - 5.5	Christian People's Party	3 - 2.7
Conservative Party	23 - 23.4	Liberal Party	11 - 12.1
Single-Tax Party	1 - 1.5	Left-Socialist Party	2 - 2.7
Socialist People's Party	15 - 11.5	Progressive Party	3 - 3.6
The Greens	2 - 0.0	Others	1 - 0.8

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

ELLEMANN-JENSEN SEEN READY FOR CONFRONTATION WITH LEFT

Also Challenges Radical Liberals

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 13 Sep 85 pp 1, 14

[Article by 'Emc']

[Text] Demands 'restoration' of foreign policy or security policy.

"It goes without saying that, on the long view, it is problematic for the government to assume the responsibility for a situation which clearly has a detrimental effect on Denmark's international reputation. The situation, therefore, may arise where the Radical Liberal Party may either be required to give the government its full and complete support--or the Social Democratic Party may be forced into an internal showdown on these issues."

These were the words of Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen in an article in the party paper LIBERAL, which appeared last Thursday, well over 1 week before the party's national congress in Herning.

Ellemann-Jensen says that the uncertainty with regard to the Danish foreign policy and security policy is a "high price" that the government has had to pay for the economic "recovery."

Volte-Face

The solid majority in support of the EC and NATO policy which has previously existed has been lost on account of the volte-face executed by the Social Democratic Party.

"A volte-face which clearly has resulted from the government's success with its economic policy--and the lack of an alternative on the part of the Social Democratic Party."

Ellemann-Jensen concludes his article by saying that the government has still got unsolved tasks in the domestic policy area.

"However, it is becoming increasingly troublesome having to take the responsibility for a number of the actions which we have to accept--or even perform--



in order to create the political basis for carrying through the daily work in the economic policy area.

Similar considerations are bound to make themselves felt within large sections of the Social Democratic Party.

For it is solely the unfortunate tradition for strong party discipline and support of the leader of Denmark's largest party which has made possible the many footnotes and other difficulties in our cooperation with our international partners and allies," Ellemann-Jensen writes.

The introduction by the foreign minister and chairman of the Liberal Party to the foreign policy confrontation appears immediately prior to what will probably turn out to be a stormy meeting within the marketing committee of the Folketing today.

In this meeting, there will be consultations with Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen on the recently concluded discussions among the foreign ministers of the EC on developments within the EC cooperation

#### Vote of Censure

Ivar Nørgaard (Social Democratic Party) does not want to rule out the possibility that a vote of censure of the foreign minister may be moved. According to HOLBÆK AMTS VENSTREBLAD, he wants to await the outcome of the meeting of the marketing committee. In addition to Nørgaard, the political leader of the Radical Liberal Party, Niels Helveg Petersen, is displeased with the conduct of the foreign minister at the EC meeting of foreign ministers.

Helveg Petersen states that the foreign minister has presented the Danish viewpoints in a "defeatist" manner.

Ivar Nørgaard states, incidentally, that closer cooperation may be established among the EC countries in the areas of energy, environment, work environment, research and technological developments. "The foreign minister ought to have stressed to his colleagues in the EC that veritable tiger leaps may be made within the existing treaties of the EC, as long as they have got the political will for it," says former minister Ivar Nørgaard.



Illustration to Ellemann-Jensen's Article in LIBERAL

### Striving to Revive Liberals

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 21 Sep 85 p 7

[Article by Carl Otto Brix]

[Text] Uffe Ellemann-Jensen's difficult task is to revive the Liberal Party, and that is a struggle against many opposing forces.

Ideology plays a subordinate role to the largest party within the government, and for that reasons, among others, ideology has to play a superior role to the second-largest party within the government.

The chairman of the Conservative Party, Prime Minister Poul Schluter, has made the qualified statement that ideology is rubbish. The chairman of the Liberal Party, Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, has had extensive work carried through to improve the profile of the Liberal Party, and the debate on ideology will become a central issue at the party's national congress in Herning over the weekend.

The Liberal Party has got no problem of succession. Ellemann-Jensen combines the office of king with that of a crown prince, even if there is a certain amount of interest in the election of the deputy chairman.

Indeed, the problems of the Liberal Party are in an entirely different area. How is the party to change the situation that it still has approximately twenty seats in the Folketing without any signs of progress, but with a clear tendency to become extinct together with the voters who are right now voting for the party?

Or asked in a different way:

How is the Liberal Party, without being disloyal, able to prevent Poul Schluter and the Conservatives from winning the entire prize in a nice election result?

These were the questions which Liberals asked of themselves last year when they were to elect a new chairman to succeed EC Commissioner Henning Christophersen. An argument in favor of Ellemann-Jensen was that he was able to "win votes," contrary, probably, to the other candidate, Ivar Hansen, the chairman of the Folketing group, who probably is the one who comes closest to being a traditional Liberal.

If one is to believe the opinion polls, Ellemann-Jensen has not been able to win many new votes for the party. Not many voters feel inclined to vote for him, except for the regular party members.

Ellemann-Jensen himself does not want to accept the idea that he might be able to gain a lot of additional votes for the party, for he is of the opinion that the Liberal Party has to find its voters in a more serious manner, and that is why he resorts to other methods than the friendly homeliness attempted by certain parties.

The leaders of the Social Democratic Party are able to talk to Poul Schluter--and conversely, but with Ellemann-Jensen there is no way at all. Anker Jørgensen, Ivar Nørgaard and Lasse Budtz see red when his name is mentioned, and he does not do anything himself to change things.

Also that has got something to do with the fact that this party and its chairman are different from its big partner. But it has also got something to do with personalities.

#### Born a Liberal

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, 43, was born a Liberal, the son of Jens Peter Jensen, chief editor of FYNs TIDENDE, but venomous tongues have it that he only got his membership card when he was climbing the steps to the rostrum of the Folketing. He became widely known throughout Denmark as a knowledgeable and witty political and economic reporter on TV-AVISEN after having reached his years of discretion as a reporter in Det Berlingske Hus.

As chief editor of the daily BØRSEN he got on such bad terms with his colleagues that the board of directors found it most prudent to take leave of him. However, he was hardly over his defeat when the Århus West constituency needed a candidate. The election committee chose the well-known editor and political science graduate. He entered the Folketing in the election of February 1977, and since then his political career has soared. He soon became political spokesman and stood the test during the Social-Democratic, Liberal government. It was not easy defending former enemies and attacking former friends, and the expected collapse of this misalliance came as a relief.

Within the four-leaf clover government, he found his right place as foreign minister. With his background as an economist and a reporter and with his talents, this is the very ideal field for this man who is best suited for working with results. Opposition is to him a weary task.

#### Focus of Anger

However, there was no knowing that the very foreign minister would become the focus of anger on the part of the Opposition. Security policy is his field, and he has more than once told the Social Democratic Party that he feels that the party has failed the country. And it is done in such terms and in such a way as to leave an icy atmosphere between the foreign minister and the Social Democratic Party.

However, for this very reason, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen has also got a considerable number of admirers. They view him as the guarantee of Denmark's firm security policy, a man who will neither allow himself to be cowed nor scared.

The same thing holds true of the EC policy.

From Uffe Ellemann-Jensen one may hear about the nature of true politics. It is hardly via him that broad compromises are reached.

One of the questions that Liberals will have to ask of themselves in connection with the national congress is whether this is the attitude which will anew make the Liberal Party a large and leading party. This question will presumably be repeated with increased force after the municipal elections on 19 November.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# INDUSTRY, CDU AT ODDS ON ARMS EXPORT RESTRICTIONS

## Industry Fears Marketing Crisis

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 6 Sep 85 p 19

[Article by Wolfgang Hoffmann: "Too Many Exports Are Addictive: A Warning Against Forcing Arms Deals"]

[Text] The recommendation to the Federal Government could not be clearer: "In view of the declining demand in the Third World, one must advise against any attempt to expand West German arms exports. The hoped-for advantages will by no means compensate for the expected problems."

Author of the well-meaning advice is Joachim Krause, scientific colleague of the renowned Science and Politics Foundation in Ebenhausen, from where the institute conducts political research with a practical orientation, not least for the Federal Chancellor's Office in Bonn, whose budget finances the foundation--with DM13 million this year.

The recommendation that the present restrictive course for arms exports be maintained may well play a role as early as one of the next sessions of the Foreign Relations Committee. Prior to the summer break, the Federal Government had promised to give the committee confidential information on new German arms exports. It primarily involves exports to Saudi Arabia. According to the information of SPD representative Norbert Gansel, it is a matter of exports that clearly show, in terms of both quantity and quality, that the Federal Government has abandoned its previous restrictive position and has given in to the pressure of the defense industry.

In so doing, however, it may be that Bonn has not done itself a favor. For it is more likely that hard times are ahead for international arms merchants and thus for German dealers as well. After the arms boom in the 1960's and 1970's, the 1980's have so far been characterized by stagnation, which, as Krause sees it, will "probably mean that the associated marketing problems in connection with the industrial overproduction of armaments in the West and the East--problems that have heretofore been masked by arms exports--will be felt more strongly."

Joachim Krause divides international trade with conventional weapons and arms--it is also concerned with political power and influence--into three submarkets: a Western market with 15 to 20 percent, an Eastern market with about 10 percent, and a market in the Third World with 70 to 75 percent of the overall volume of about \$40 billion, or about 2 percent of total world trade.

If the Western arms market is relatively small, then that has to do with the fact that in many cases the Western industrial countries have established their own armaments factories and are therefore largely able to supply themselves independently of the United States, which continues to be the largest arms supplier. But the United States continues to play a dominant role. It supplies 70 percent of the Western arms market. The fact that the Western countries are largely self-sufficient militarily is, however, one of the reasons for the current stagnation in the arms business. In the 1960's, the FRG--for a long time and still the largest Western importer of arms--was still procuring about half of its military requirements from abroad. Meanwhile, the proportion accounted for by imports has fallen to 15 percent.

The compulsion to export is programed by the expansion of arms production. Krause: "Since, as a rule, the Western countries--with the exception of the United States--for reasons of cost effectiveness must produce more armaments than they can use themselves, they generally face the necessity of exporting."

#### What to Do With the Surplus?

More and more countries are producing more for export than for their own armies: France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands. The exception is the FRG. Its exports have heretofore been well under 25 percent of its own consumption. Altogether, however, the arms production of all NATO countries exceeds the continuing requirements of their armed forces by almost 30 percent.

A marketing of the surplus production within the West is only conditionally possible, not least because of the different and incompatible weapon types. Thus it is not only the countries that compete with one another but also the firms, as Krause indicates through examples: "At the present time, 11 firms in 7 countries within the Western alliance produce antitank weapons, 18 firms in 7 countries develop and produce air defense weapons, 8 firms in 6 countries make air target drones, 16 enterprises in 7 countries produce aircraft-controlled ground target drones, and 10 firms in 7 countries manufacture antiship missiles." The list of NATO weapon systems that are not compatible with each other could be continued at will.

The public arms market is not troubled with such problems. In contrast to NATO, the Warsaw Pact has been successful in an extraordinary standardization of weapon systems, which not only increases their operational capabilities but is also cheaper. Also different from the Western alliance, in which the United States has so far been successful in protecting its system of the one-way street--arms exports to Europe but no imports from there--is the fact that there is a two-way street among the arms-producing states of the East.

"Poland and the CSSR even export more armaments to the USSR than they receive from there," the study indicates. In contrast to the NATO countries, however, the smaller countries in the Eastern bloc essentially have only the option of either reproducing Soviet weapon systems or contributing to Soviet armament through the delivery of components. Krause: "Based upon its technological level, the CSSR, for example, would be in a position to produce considerably more sophisticated systems than it is permitted to reproduce under license."

In the end, therefore, the Eastern system is also merely a variation of the American one-way street. With its system, the USSR prevents its satellites from achieving independence in the arms industry. On the other hand, the system is also beneficial--especially to the USSR. In this connection, the study points out: "In the first place, there is an increase in the overall capacity of the Warsaw Pact to produce armaments and the Kremlin is given more flexibility not only in time of crises and war but also in the export of arms to the Third World. Secondly, the takeover of relatively simple weapon systems by Poland, the CSSR and Romania takes a load off of Soviet armaments factories and makes it possible for them to concentrate on up-to-date technologies. Thirdly, through deliveries from the GDR and the CSSR, the Soviet defense industry can profit from the high technical level that these countries have achieved in some sectors of civilian production."

Measured against export figures, the ratio of overproduction between East and West is one to two: whereas the Eastern bloc exported arms valued at about \$14 billion in 1982, Western industrial countries exported armaments valued at around \$28 billion. As long as purchasing power in the oil-producing countries was rising and the more progressive developing countries wanted to satisfy their military ambitions, there were no problems with the sale of the overproduction. On the contrary. Krause: "Whereas the volume of arms exports to the Third World in the 1960's had already doubled relative to the 1950's, exports in the 1970's were four times greater than in the decade before."

#### Declining Demand

Because of the high indebtedness of the Third World and the smaller returns from oil, a continuation of the trend is unlikely, as the stagnation of the recent years has shown. Lately sellers must even get used to the fact that the market has turned into a buyer's market. And that means that the buyer dictates the terms of sale. Thus the sellers must increasingly take into account the wishes of the receiving countries to preserve their industries and to save or recover foreign exchange.

For the developing countries, to which about three-fourths of all arms exports go, the transformation into a buyer's market has the advantage that they can use the competition of the sellers "to gain some freedom of action relative to their arms suppliers and to improve the conditions for arms purchases in their favor."

It is apparent that the developing countries are more and more frequently making themselves independent from their traditional main suppliers--either the United States or the USSR depending upon their politics--and are falling back on European arms, for example. According to an investigation by the American business magazine FORTUNE, the Europeans have since learned to sell their arms. According to the magazine's research, Europe as a group overtook the United States last year, and the easier access to European technologies contributed to this.

Whereas in the United States basically every export must be approved, the Europeans, as a rule, require export approvals only for the group of strategically especially interesting goods. In addition, heretofore only the FRG has been very restrictive in handling arms exports outside of the NATO area. The other Europeans, in contrast, are extraordinarily agile in their arms deals. "Champagne flowed on board a special train taking the visiting delegation through the countryside to observe how French tanks and artillery thunder across the field of maneuvers," reports FORTUNE. An study by Hamburg University confirms that the sales promotion of the German defense industry has become very much more aggressive than it was just a few years ago.

These, then, are the first signs of the dependency in which the defense industry has maneuvered itself through overproduction and the pressure to export. And its latitude is becoming even narrower, because of late the already-advanced developing countries--such as Brazil, Argentina, Red China, and North and South Korea--are coming into the market with their output. Since about one-third of the available volume of exports to the Third World is out of the question for Europeans because of the well-established relations of the United States and the USSR with their respective clienteles, Krause thinks that the run on the remaining possible recipient countries, especially the few financially solid countries, will become more intense. The scientist from Ebenhausen does not even exclude the possibility "that bribery, espionage or other illegal methods to eliminate competition in the arms business will become more important." In this connection, it appears that both the United States and the USSR as well as countries such as France and Great Britain have recognized that in the end their generous arms shipments have not fulfilled the political expectations that were tied to them. The arms exports had often even led to serious strains in other political relations.

Krause believes that a marketing crisis is inevitable for the defense industries, above all in Western Europe. The result will be higher procurement prices for arms of domestic production and the appeal for increased direct and indirect subsidies for shipbuilding, the aviation industry, and other branches. Therefore, the financial latitude for military procurements could possibly be restricted at a time when Western Europe must increase the effectiveness of conventional deterrence with resources that are already tight.



To be sure, the FRG will not be spared all of this but it still has the chance of limiting the expected damage if it continues its restrictive export regulations. Krause's recommendation to the Federal Government: "A strength of the West German economy is precisely in the fact that the prevailing restrictive approval policy has taught it to be prepared for poor prospects in the arms export business and to be flexible."

Krause's final verdict: "The export of arms is generally tied to political follow-up costs that tend to be more detrimental than beneficial for a country like the FRG that is so dependent upon civilian exports. The great export successes of the West German economy in the last 20 years were certainly linked to no small degree to the fact that there were hardly any politically troublesome impulses from military transfers."

#### CDU Wants Export Restrictions

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Sep 85 p 5

[Article by fy: "CDU Wants a Restrictive Arms-Export Policy: Committee Presents Theses on Development and Armament"]

[Text] Bonn, 10 Sept--There is little chance that the FRG and other Western states will limit arms expenditures of the countries of the Third World by refusing to sell weapons to them. Nevertheless, for reasons of its own self-understanding and its "moral burden" from German history, the FRG should continue its restrictive policy on arms exports. This is the view held by the special Federal Development Policy Committee of the CDU in a resolution presented Tuesday in Bonn on the subject "development and armament." The Federal Government should permit exceptions to the prohibition of arms exports when this is can be justified in individual cases on the basis of vital foreign-policy and security interests. Decisive in this case must be whether arms shipments promote the maintenance or restoration of stability.

Among other things, the resolution points out that there is, to be sure, no direct connection between the armament efforts in the industrial countries and the difficulties of the Third World but that there probably is a connection between the defense efforts of the underdeveloped countries themselves and their economic situation. Their share of worldwide military expenditures has increased from 10 percent in the 1960's to 25 percent today; in 1982, the developing countries spent \$190 billion for defense purposes. The thesis that the accumulation of weapons has led to conflicts with the Third World is contradicted. The contrary is probably true: existing political conflicts have stimulated the demand for arms. In the Third World since 1945, a total of more than 21 million people have been killed or wounded in more than 100 armed conflicts. The importation of arms has meant that financial resources urgently needed for development projects were used elsewhere. Today the share of arms imports in the indebtedness of the developing countries must be estimated at about 25 percent. The lion's share of armament efforts is concentrated in about 30 countries. One can, on the other hand, "hardly accuse" the more than 100 other developing countries of excessive military endeavors. Although the authors themselves use the term "accuse" in their paper in evaluating the policies of these countries, they also indicate in

that paper that attempts from outside to get them to apply other policies would generally be understood as "undue interference" and would be counterproductive.

As a whole, the paper reveals helplessness among the makers of development policy. It establishes that:

1. There is no causal connection between the defense expenditures of the industrial countries and the underdevelopment in the Third World.
2. Unilateral measures to limit armaments are not promising and are in danger of being counterproductive, for the arms market has become a "buyer's market," so that the refusal to sell would merely lead to purchases from other suppliers or to the development of domestic defense industries, as in Brazil, Argentina and India.
3. The elimination of underdevelopment depends not only upon financial resources but also upon such questions as infrastructure, demographics and the attendant historical, political and social conditions in these countries.

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

# STALINIST PAPER REPORTS ON FEUD WITH CP LEADERSHIP

## Secret Meeting Minutes Revealed

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 30 Aug 85 p 9

[Article by Risto Repo: "Thus It Has Been Decided"]

[Text] Time: 6/7-18/1985. Place: Sirola Institute, Tietola. Present: Esko Vainionpaa, chairman, Seppo Ahonen, Asko Jarvinen, Pekka Jylha, Helena Kerman, Aimo Kuussalo, Erkki Moilanen, Asko Maki, Tapio Oikarinen, Reijo Ranta, Alvar Risberg, Erkki Rontynen, Hannu Saimanen, Jukka Salonen, Paavo Suosalo, Kalervo Vainikainen, Reijo Vrang, Risto Koskinen, Pia Keranen, Raimo Ahoniemi, Oiva Bjorkbacka, Ilpo Eerola, Aulis Leppanen, secretary.

The list of names indicates that, besides certain Central Committee functionaries, a group of district secretaries participated in the meeting led by the general secretary of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP). No one was invited to the meeting from eight party districts.

In a report of the proceedings of the event it was called "A Conference of the SKP District Secretaries." Such an organ is not known to the SKP rules. In spite but even the whole people's democratic movement.

"The Following Was Decided"

The second article of the proceedings describing the meeting is entitled "Internal Situation and What to Do About I." It attests that, "Esko Vainionpaa gave an account of the state of affairs within the party. On the basis of the account and the ensuing discussion, the following was decided:

1. The chairman noted that the discussion functioned as a prelude for further elaborations on the matter. It was agreed during the discussion that internal settlement of the accounts has to be begun during the fall central committee meeting. There were different ideas about whether the measures would be directed, at first, at all eight district organizations or only at a portion (1-2) of them. The pending nature of the litigation has to be taken into consideration; it complicates matters.

2. The meeting of the district secretaries to be held in the fall will consider steps to be taken in the party and in the preliminary preparations for parliamentary elections. It was confirmed that the opinions in all the districts were such that the TIEDONANTAJA group could not be approved for the Social Democratic (SKDL) ticket."

#### Double-dealing

These few lines point out the naked truth, that a decision about dissolving both the SKP as well as the SKDL electoral coalitions has already been made. Thus all the motions made by the party leadership about restoring party unity have been and are nothing but theater.

The first part of the proceedings reveals that what is meant by the "measures directed" at the district organizations specifically is that they will be dropped from the party and that, for example, no appeal, no negotiation or anything comparable would be directed at them. The mention about the "pending nature of the litigation," you see, refers to the suit brought against the change of rules of the special meeting of the delegates. The central committee can drop the districts only after the legality of the special meeting of the delegates and the legality of the change of rules approved by that meeting, has been clarified in court, and this is the circumstance which thus "complicates matters." (This will perhaps explain to doubters why the party veterans filed the suit in the spring, for among other things they wanted to win time for the battle being fought about party unity.)

The following lines tell of the party leadership's purely tactical stand toward SKP unity: "There are different ideas about whether the measures will at first be directed at all eight district organizations or only at a portion (1-2) of them."

#### Election Unity

In this meeting decisions were made not "only" about the future of the SKP, but on behalf of the entire communist and people's democratic movement. The decision was made at the meeting that the "TIEDONANTAJA group cannot be approved for the SKDL ticket."

The next elections are the parliamentary elections to be held in March 1987. Authority over the SKDL tickets can be granted only by SKDL, whose members, in addition to SKP, include the Finnish Women's Democratic League (SNDL), the Democratic Youth League of Finland (SDNL) as well as the Socialist Student League (SOL). The group of functionaries led by the general secretary has thus made a decision concerning the matter on behalf of all these organizations, without even having the decision-making organs of the SKP consider election unity. It is no wonder that criticism has surfaced even among SKDL socialist circles, about the Stalinist undertakings of the present party leadership.



## Prospects

An attempt has had to be made to explain the exclusion in the best way it could be to the membership that is indisposed toward it. Esko Vainionpaa has made it known in all interviews that the SKP situation has to be "solved" at least a year before the parliamentary election battle begins, namely this fall. In this way the election battle would not be fought under the cloud of "an unfortunate party dispute."

## Great Purge

If, you see, the party leadership wishes to keep the SKDL party tickets clean of communists and people's democrats acting on behalf of party unity, Vainionpaa's great purge has to be extended to the individual party divisions and members and to all people's democratic organizations. There will have to be exclusions, exclusions, and once again exclusions, voting at meetings and ability to convince hundreds, perhaps even thousands of members and supporters, why that comrade, known to be loyal, can no longer be set up even as a candidate.

It is unlikely that a very good understanding will be reached even at the work places during the next spring and winter, about why now, during the bitterest wage battle, the labor front should be torn asunder, for that is what Vainionpaa's plans signify.

If the dissolution of the election coalition is carried out, organizations will have to be smashed, as will relations among people, and perhaps even election laws. The general secretary is going to have to wallow in "party controversy" for the next two years in ways he could not even have dreamt of if he starts down this road.

## Rightist Circles Blamed

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish . 30 Aug 85 p 9

[Commentary by Erkki Susi: "Big Capital Near Its Goal"]

[Text] Big capital and rightist circles are preparing to celebrate the destruction of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) as a united Marxist-Leninist party. Using the analogy of cannibal jokes: the pot has been put to boil already, the victim is eyed hungrily and the salivary glands are dancing a polka from sheer joy.

But the staff of the big money have been wrong before. For example, during the spring of 1983 the leadership of the EVA [Economic Council] delegation held the dissolution of SKP to be a matter of weeks. It turned out otherwise.

But now the demise of the SKP is finally supposed to be a sure thing. This certainly is reflected in the increasingly open foreign policy stands as well as internal policy formulations by Max Jacobson and other representatives of big capital.

When we speak of big capital and the rightists' wanting revenge for all the progressive accomplishments gained since the war, then undoubtedly this revenge can be seen as culminating in the changing of our foreign policy and the elimination of SKP. The latter is a lever which aids in changing foreign policy and the ripening of preconditions of internal policy changes.

Big capital is not preparing for the destruction of SKP simply as a happy bystander. It has been pushing hard to destroy the SKP. It is quite instructive again to go through both EVA as well as the secret and public materials of the big capitalist organizations functioning before its time.

They reveal in really quite a gruesome fashion how the goals concerning the weakening of the rights of labor, the shift to the right in internal power relations, and the crumbling of the YYA [Friendship Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Party] line in foreign policy has, at every turn, been centrally linked to the elimination of SKP by isolation, integration and dissolution.

It is known that the 1960's formulations of big capital about the breaking of SKP's revolutionary poison fang have not been without results. SKP has been both splintered and weakened efficiently through the rightist governmental and income politics as well as with the help of the "historical compromise." Jacobson has bragged that the springboard for the "historical compromise" and the social agreement sponsored by EVA are truly the same.

The secret directive of the reactionary organizations, prepared during the early 70's, according to which the "internal dissolution of the communist movement should be intensified" and the "plans for closing ranks and restoring internal unity" should be frustrated has been realized systematically.

At the end of the 70's EVA set for itself the task of changing over to a "Scandinavian party structure," by withering and splintering the large communist party which did not fit into this structure.

EVA could note progress in this direction with satisfaction. Already during the EVA-days in the fall of 1982, Jacobson dared to make the following estimate: "The weakening of support for the Finnish Communist Party, its splintering into two factions and the articulation of the majority into parliamentary cooperation already signify in themselves a structured change in our political life. There is hardly anyone in the country who any longer rears a communist coup."

The estimate was almost shown to be too bold, when SKP, during the next year and the year following, took steps toward great revolutionism and unity.

This development, however, was halted by the ax-line coup at the 20th delegation meeting.

All the secret operations of big capital and the rightists for the destruction of SKP will perhaps never be revealed. However, enough material has come to light so that there is no doubt about the matter.

This makes even more remarkable and significant the reaction of Arvo Aalto and Aarne Saarinen to the article published in the Soviet paper ZA RUBEZHOM in February 1984, in which the underhanded work against the SKP was described. Aalto labeled the article "irrelevant;" Saarinen, "deliberate misrepresentation" and "biased."

Aalto's and Saarinen's reaction could not have resulted from ignorance. Then what did it result from?

12989

CSO: 3617/ 170

POLITICAL

GREECE

UNITED STATES SAID TO KNOWINGLY BEFRIEND PAPANDREOU 'DICTATORSHIP'

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 29-30 Sep 85 p 8

[Article by "E": Realities...]

[Excerpts] All of these things are just like a parody!

All the noise about an "executive bureau," a pale copy of other regimes, is, as far as we are concerned, various justifications for the one person to continue to impose his decisions, his plans, his behavior.

Does any sincere person, who knows how to read and write, have any doubts that at this time, during these recent years, we are living under a kind of dictatorship, whose leader is the all-powerful Andreas Papandreou?

He says what he wants, he does what he wants, he changes theories, he is cooking up socialist dishes with either a red sauce or plain boiled broth, he is defrauding, not only us, but also his own people, he is letting them believe in promises, in future honors and promotions and then he suddenly sends them packing.

Of course, you will say that he arrived at this point with the vote of the Greek people; he did not grab power with tanks, he is not holding onto it with chains, he is not using violence.

Only fraud...

That is why the Papandreou dictatorship is "sui generis." It is not barbaric, and therefore it does not awaken resistance, it does not give birth to organized movements of opposition. Its victims are not mistreated, they are not exiled to some godforsaken island.

We are its victims. Friends and enemies, partisan or foes, green and blue and red and pink; all of you and all of us are paying daily the price for this invisible, but nonetheless dangerous, dictatorship.

As the country is going downhill, we are all paying, without even understanding it. Not that there is a cover-up; recently, there is even a tendency to sincerity about our dreadful condition. Of course, nothing is said about where the blame should be apportioned, or else the fault is attributed to others, to



previous regimes, or to vague, mysterious enemies, multinational ogres and capitalistic beasts, which have chosen little Greece as their target.

Everything is going down. The drachma and the economy, our relations with the outside world, which is watching our downward course, our important national problems, other domestic issues; everything is being met with the lack of efficiency, the continual and improbable lack of efficiency of the Andreas dictatorship.

It is possible that he does not perceive all this. As a remedy, he regularly proceeds to execute some of his own men, in order to throw the attention on other individuals, to attribute the blame to others.

You saw what happened the other day...

He cut off all the favorite children of the "executive bureau." Not that they had held any real power, but we were always hearing about Gennimatas, Simitis, Laliotis. "The new people are totally unknown. They are his own men, who will get up and sit down at his command, they are useless, but then, weren't the other ones, the known ones, useless as well?"

How near to a dictatorship Andreas is can be seen in the increasing kindness and patience shown by the Americans. Let our great friends forgive us, these same friends who are among the few to enjoy real democracy in today's world, but it seems that they do not believe that other countries, especially the little, poor ones, are worthy of such luxury. It is better for them to have a leader who is not dependent on the democratic process, who does not have to worry about Parliament, about opposition, about public opinion and the press.

The great countries can get along better with a politician who is a sort of dictator; they let him say what he wants from balconies, they forgive him some audacities; it is enough that, at the given time, he falls into step discreetly, he agrees, he signs, he gives himself up.

That is what Andreas is doing. And one is compelled to say "so much the better." He at least fears someone, and it is better if this someone is from the Western world.

But Andreas is alone. He does not seem to be making friends, but is isolating Kastri, and his old faithful followers--Alevras, for instance--are standing beside him, but without a trace of the old enthusiasm, while the climate of relations with the president of the Republic is getting increasingly colder, without any real prospect of warming up.

The people who can claim to know Andreas well--and there are not many--believe that the presidency is undoubtedly his future goal, and the only thing they don't know is how he will plan his climb without waiting too long.

As we said in the beginning, we, the "free" Greeks, are living in a so-called democracy governed by a mediocre dictator seemingly supported by the United States, and we are all tolerating him...

Some because they have not realized how dangerous he is, and others because we know of no method to get rid of him.

Yes, I know: elections.

But where is the dictator who does not see to it--as happened on 2 June--that elections are won?...

CSO: 3521/4-P

POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI'S INGRAO SEES PSI POLICY HINDERING COOPERATION

PM071301 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 26 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by Pietro Ingrao, PCI Directorate member: "Appeal for Unity Fine, But What Is PSI's Policy?"]

[Excerpts] I would like to make some points about a recent article by Comrade Giorgio Napolitano in response to interviews with and articles by Giolitti, Ruffolo, and Arfe which have appeared in L'UNITA recently. The article makes points which I agree with concerning the PSI's role, the importance of unitary relations, and the more open-minded, careful, and flexible assessment that we must make of a whole series of experiences carried out by European Social Democratic and Socialist forces.

Nevertheless, there is a point of disagreement which I feel the need to express. Calls for unity are fine. But is unitary strategy really taking a step forward if we fail to tackle the real points of fracture with the PSI's present policy? I fear that unless we do so we will not even eradicate the splittist stances which exist and which must be combated.

Everyone is appealing for specificity, and I will base my argument on a specific example. I have deliberately chosen the very foreign policy issues in which Napolitano perceives a lesser distance between us and the Socialist Party's policy.

I cannot conceive of matters of foreign policy without centering them on the nuclear issue, now a crucially pressing problem (Togliatti spoke in terms of "mankind's future"). Do you remember the Euromissiles, the first of nuclear weapons deployed in the heart of Europe? That was not enough. The United States has opened up a new phase designed to take the conflict into space. And we know full well that this nuclear invasion of space will impart an unprecedented boost to the power of military-industrial structures; it will involve science in the militarization of politics; it will encourage others in the arms race; and it will waste further vast resources withheld from urgent tasks of peace. An interview given by General Abrahamson, director of the American SDI project, on a pilgrimage to Europe, spoke in terms of the "total automation of military and political decisions" in the new phase. The NEW STATESMAN has revealed the understandings that already exist between the United States and Britain for control of British territory. This is the

present. These are the real problems of democracy in our time. And they concern not only the keys to tomorrow's war but the distribution of real powers right now.

In order to tackle the nuclear dimension the Left must build a new internationalism, different from the defeated and buried one of the Second and Third Internationals. This is the new frontier to be reached. To confine myself to our own country, I believe that this raises the issue of the present NATO system, the methods which now deprive parliament of real decisionmaking powers over very serious politico-military commitments, and the people's powers concerning nuclear bases and weapons banned by international treaties.

Is this too much? Let us not delude ourselves; if we fail to achieve these goals it is not only peace that is threatened: It is the democratic principle that is scorned. And we cannot believe that this fails to impinge on people's consciences, on the way in which they tackle (or fail to tackle) struggle in the factory and within society, and on the very meaning which they attach to their political allegiances.

Moreover, without this initial turnabout Europe will remain blocked and split by a nuclear race which is continuing and which will inevitably tend to exacerbate matters. Despite our appeals and our criticism, the East will be constricted (as Reagan wants) and reforms in that crucial part of the world will be delayed or weaker, or not take place at all.

[PM071303] Under such conditions what are the real prospects of a unitary policy of the Left? I am not too surprised even by the "Greenpeace" affair and by Mitterrand's regrettable visit to Muroroa. I am not sure whether they are exactly--how shall I put it?--a "mistake." There is a logic to the French "Watergate." Unless the spiral of the race is eliminated the process of nuclear arms proliferation will spread. And in this race the Left will split again, perhaps between nations. Even now we have on the one hand Olof Palme and the Von Buelow (SPD) report talking in favor of nuclear-free zones and on the other [hand] Mitterrand gathering France's military elite on a Pacific atoll to reassert France's imperial rights.

So where and how will the protagonists--not only national but necessarily international too--emerge for a response to the neoconservative strategy? And how can we hope that even the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting can open the way to a swing, unless these new national and international protagonists take shape?

This is where I perceive the lack of realism, unfoundedness, and shortsightedness of the policy of the present Socialist leadership, which has said "yes" to Euromissiles, does not make a policy of denuclearization a central issue, and has combated the pacifist movement. I am not even questioning its intentions. I am merely recording facts which now show the Socialist Party to be a prisoner of the U.S. imperial rationale, which keeps it--primarily for these reasons--subordinate to the moderate forces and I am looking at this paradoxical situation whereby Europe (though not only Europe but the whole of the Third World!) is excluded from the debate about missiles on our territories and about threats which affect the entire world.



Let us suppose for a moment that my arguments are well founded. If so, the debate about the strategy of the Left and on the policy of and toward the PSI must be firmly rooted to these essential problems in order to be resolved. Let us Communists enter the field with our options and our action.

I say frankly that I see here a sphere and an example of the limits and weaknesses which there have been in our whole struggle not only against the policy of the five-party government, but also against the new forms of U.S. domination in our country and on our continent. How can we think seriously about an effective program for combating unemployment without shifting the vast resources which are now swallowed up by the arms race and launching a process which removes the distortions which exist in the Third World? And can Europe really face the limitations and inconsistencies of its present development, and overcome the dilemmas facing it, unless a process is started which launches a new strategy toward the Third World? I am not referring only to the quantity of resources to be transferred from the policies of war to the goals of peace. I am not just thinking of the decisive (for everybody) problem of the Third World's awesome debt (Fidel Castro's proposal). I am thinking of the directions taken by technological research. I am thinking of the lack of real initiatives with regard to the massacre of blacks in South Africa, and the grotesque visit by European delegates: to be specific--of the inability to cast off the burden of solidarity which binds us to the dictates of American imperialism.

CSO: 3528/4

POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI'S NAPOLITANO ON PROSPECTS OF THAW WITH PSI

PM261020 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 22 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by PCI Directorate member Giorgio Napolitano: "Thus We Will Be Able To Address the Entire Left"]

[Text] The interviews which Antonio Giolitti [former PSI Directorate member] and Giorgio Ruffolo [PSI Directorate member] contributed to the debate in L'UNITA stimulate us--and themselves contribute--to a broader and more clear-cut examination of the problems troubling the Italian and European left and of PCI-PSI relations. Thus preparations for our congress are gradually acquiring the scope and openness of a debate extending well beyond the difficulties and the horizons of the PCI alone. The future of the left and the prospects of Italian democracy are at stake.

Giolitti's statements cannot be dismissed as a drastic verdict on the PSI, while Ruffolo's were not confined to an expression of disagreement with that verdict; but none of us can or intends to evade the debate on such a controversial and significant point, as though Giolitti's "provocation" had caused us embarrassment and it were preferable for us to surround it with a cautious silence. We are also keen to take up the anxieties and arguments which [former PSI senator] Gaetano Arfe subsequently put forward in a stimulating and penetrating article again in L'UNITA. However, it would be better to proceed from a broader framework of considerations which, for that matter, these comrades' contributions have helped to define.

Two classes of issues combine in deliberations about the PCI, inseparable from an overall examination of the state of society and the political forces in Italy--those shared by all components of the European left and those confined to our own country, from the viewpoint not only of the objective conditions of the economy and the state but also of the conditions of harsh division between the left-wing and reformist forces and of the "blockage" in the political system. So it is understandable that we and our congress are being watched with genuine interest both by those who expect from the PCI a further and more resolute contribution to the solution of the difficulties facing progressive parties and movements in all West European countries and to stimulating a new regenerative thrust and action in Italy and those who, though representing social, cultural and political viewpoints different from the traditional ones of the PCI or of the left, in the narrowest sense, nevertheless

perceive in our party's acquisition of a sharper and more concrete character as a government force the only chance of invigorating Italian democracy, thus making it truly a "complete democracy" through the creation of a real and credible government alternative. There is widespread anxiety in various circles about the deterioration of a political situation and a government formula full of shortcomings and contradictions and at the same time ossified and lacking any valid solutions and scope for change, about the exacerbation of still unresolved fundamental problems, and about the persistence of manifold phenomena of regression and decline--an anxiety which is nurturing a major current of positive critical interest in our debate.

We are well aware that expectations and encouragements of this kind are accompanied by artificial campaigns whose sole aim is to create dissatisfaction and misdirected responses within our party, to damage our prestige and to provide an excuse for those wanting to perpetuate the old discriminations against it--campaigns of systematic distortion of our stances and of manipulatory pressure for an absurd debasement of our heritage and for an equally absurd relinquishment of our social and political role.

But this must not cause us to be indiscriminate, to reject difficult and disturbing demands nevertheless addressed to us with responsible aims and intents. I believe that all comrades, especially our grassroots members and activists, must be aware of the opportunities opening up at the moment and of the responsibilities which we therefore bear. In view of this we must not appear dominated by the fear of losing our "identity": What must guide us--partly in the light of the latest bitter electoral and political experiences--is the concern to regain our ability to exert an influence on the country's social and political life, to reassert in practice our own dynamic identity--always open to innovation--as a major force for reform and of the left standing for the ideals and values of socialism. So let us answer calmly and without preconceptions questions such as those embodied in the remarks made by Giolitti, Ruffolo and Arfe.

[PM261022] I believe it is important that it has been said that it is inadmissible to raise again with regard to the PCI any "problem of legitimization" (Giolitti), that our options as regards values and approaches, especially over the past decade, in both national and international affairs have already been decisive in eliminating old prejudices against the PCI, and that it is impossible to impose on us such "ridiculous" (Ruffolo) dilemmas as whether or not to join the capitalist "club." Nevertheless, it is a fact that the need is being expressed for a further "transformation" or for an outright "leap forward" on our part to help extricate the Italian left from its straits (and to make an even greater contribution to the European left's research and action). Actually this need is not made sufficiently explicit and to some extent it is up to us to try to interpret and understand it. Ruffolo sharply emphasizes the need to return to the issues of "real socialism" because of their importance in our party's "historical memory"--and I can understand his concern, but I believe that in fact the verdict we have reached on the "Soviet model" has been largely absorbed by our ranks and that it can in any case be considered irreversible, so that it must be clearly reasserted especially so as

to make it clear that our attention with regard to what is going on in the countries of "real socialism" and particularly in the USSR today and our political initiative--in the interests of peace and cooperation--with respect to such important and essential interlocutors in no way jeopardize the radical critical differentiation concerning ideological conceptions and international stance which has culminated in our deliberations in recent years. Apart from this point, the need for further "transformation" that is being put to us seems to me to concern mainly a more resolute and consistent espousal by our party of the most valid traditions and experiences of the other "wing" of the West European workers movement and left too--the socialist and social democratic wing.

Giolitti seems anxious about the persistence among us of old "attitudes" and "certainties"--the result of the thorough and extensive cultural formulations of the past--which, I infer, are supposedly reflected partly in "a kind of reticence when it comes to talking about social democracy." Arfe too talks about a shortcoming on our part in connection with the necessary "cultural operation" of regeneration and amplification of our historical assessment of the European Socialist tradition and of assimilation of "everything vital" in that tradition. I believe this point is not unfounded. Certainly we have--and not just in the past few years--carried out important political acts of dialogue, rapprochement, and cooperation with Socialist and Social Democratic parties in several West European countries; Berlinguer did so partly by means of unquestionably significant meetings with some of the most representative figures of the European social democratic and socialist movement. But despite these acts and "signs"--which (I would point out to Giolitti) have been accompanied by the disappearance of categories of assessment such as that of "failure," if not "betrayal"--there have remained within our party pockets of pure and simple, unreasoned rejection of the social democratic experiences and even tendencies toward a nominalistic contraposition and dismissive labelings--of both social democracy and social democrats--within our internal debate. We must free ourselves from these vestiges, which are particularly obsolete since in the debate that began with the 12 May Central Committee session and which has developed with a view to the congress we have been in agreement in identifying the problems and difficulties shared by our party and other European left-wing forces, in adopting as our basic strategic guideline a unitary quest and an understanding between communist forces such as the PCI and social and social democratic forces in Europe, and in identifying with the defense, albeit not uncritical, of the gains of the "welfare state" jeopardized throughout Europe by the neoconservative offensive.

[PM261024] By means of a calmer and more committed debate and a far-reaching cultural endeavor we can free ourselves of old "conditioned reflexes" without relinquishing anything that still seems valid in our historical criticism of social democratic ideas and experiences or anything that is still the original core of Italian Communists' formulations and struggle heritage. We can conduct "equal-based" dialogue--not without elements of legitimate pride in the best parts of our history, in the insights and loftiest achievements which characterize it--with socialist and social democratic forces which too, while exalting their achievements, perceive their shortcomings and are seeking new



paths. As we have often pointed out, it is not a matter of "conforming" to anything or of lighting upon ancient shores in any case roughly buffeted by the structural upheavals and right-wing tides of the past decade; it is a matter of acting together in the quest for solutions suited to problems so different from those of the past. Perhaps closer political and cultural attention on our part would have enabled us to realize many years ago the value of the fact that while we were announcing the major guidelines of what at the time was called Eurocommunism at the same time, back in 1975, three of the major European social democratic leaders--Brandt, Kreisky and Palme--were publishing the records of their intensive correspondence and conversations, which revealed in self-critical terms and worrying tones the major issues of the crisis of capitalist development and full employment, of the disruption of the North-South balance, of the nuclear arms race, of the growing threats to peace and mankind's survival--the need for a new boost to political participation and real economic democracy, for a reappraisal of the old conceptions of development and of the old social policies in West European countries, and for a new international order: the same issues and necessities which we were discussing, on the basis of a differently motivated analysis reflecting the Marxist roots and particular evolution of our dim ideological and cultural heritage together with the characteristic traits of our political experience.

We are still grappling with these issues and necessities and with further profound structural and superstructural changes both in Italy and Europe, as left-wing and reformist forces whose interlocutors now include forces whose social and historical position has been different but which have a vital interest in a resumption of economic development and--particularly in our own country--in a reform and modernization of the state and of the system of allocating resources. These are the nubs of the discussion--which must be conducted soberly--on the changes that took place between the thirties and seventies and on those now taking place within Italian and European capitalism, and on the possibilities of another "compromise" between the left and the capitalist forces or, rather, of a pact for development that will surmount the recurrent tension with unacceptable tendencies and rationales of capitalist development "left to its own devices." Furthermore, not only Giolitti and Ruffolo but even [PRI deputy secretary] Giorgio La Malfa declares himself interested in discussing "what needs to be done to change the system," even though he then proceeds to try to draw us into an ideological contest and to persuade us not to pursue the "socialist ideals" which [PCI secretary general] Natta stressed in Ferrara.

We have given partial answers, in the national and European contexts, to the new issues that have arisen over the past decade, but we must step up our efforts in order to be able to provide more and more persuasive and comprehensively consistent pointers. And I agree with the need for specificity to which Giolitti and Ruffolo draw our attention: It is necessary to make increasingly specific, we suggest, the debate on the way (options and methods) in which the public authorities and the forces of labor should act and can succeed in guiding the process of innovation; or the debate on how to loosen the constrictions that impede a new impetus of development, evading both losing postures, such as the one initially adopted by the left-wing government in

France, and policies of containment and restructuring typical of right-wing and center governments; or the debate on what character to impart to development, achieving objectives of increasing employment, social justice, solidarity, and new social and cultural values. A decisive step forward in specifying these and other aspects of our platform, a decisive step forward in making our proposals and our action more specific, perhaps constitutes our chief task in these months of preparation for the congress and beyond it, partly with a view to important though not imminent events such as the next general election.

[PM261026] Will all this suffice to give substance to a government alternative? I am well aware that this again raises the issue to which I referred at the beginning--that of the PSI and of the situation within the Italian left. Giolitti, Ruffolo, and Arfe have given us different assessments of the PSI's status and prospects. I would like to point out that the unpromising nature of Arfe's assessments of the PSI's internal dialectic did not prevent him from mentioning "a situation of flux affecting the entire Italian left which will confront the Socialist leadership group with a choice between a future as an Italian-style social democratic force--basically the reluctant but inevitable acceptance of a moderate and DC hegemony--and a future as an autonomous component of the Italian and European socialist movement." I believe that this objective assessment is to be endorsed. I believe that for this reason too we cannot agree with Giolitti when he says that the PSI's ties with the left have now been "severed" and when he judges our "attempt to rebuild a dialogue with this PSI entirely futile." No, we cannot and must not abandon an endeavor which, as Giolitti points out, some considered futile even back in the mid-sixties. We cannot form assessments that would inevitably be associated with old splittist tendencies and temptations of self-sufficiency. But this does not mean harboring illusions about the possibility of rapidly surmounting the profound differences on matters of political and ideological approach, method and conduct which have separated us from the PSI in recent years and on which the latest breakups of left-wing councils have centered, unfortunately further deepening the gulf between Communists and Socialists. Let us look realistically at the situation that has come about in PCI-PSI relations and try to pursue the most efficacious and far-sighted path. It seems to me that the best way is to confront the PSI--without being overly tactful, though without exaggerations--with certain substantive and crucial issues concerning the reformulation of a genuine program of reform, leaving aside semantic disputes about "reformism," concerning the political outlook, and concerning strategies and convergences for a government alternative. It seems to me that the right way is to be able to talk about these issues, with a unitary attitude, to the broadest socialist social and cultural area, both to all those whose "home" is now within the left and also to the "homeless"; to advance a process of transformation of the entire left, as Ruffolo said. At the same time the right way is not to remain entangled in the defense, whether substantive or superficial, or continuity with communist tradition at a time when we are called upon to compete with the PSI in the role of the broader representation, both political and ideological, of all the historical traditions and new tasks of the Italian and European left. The right way is to put forward institutional proposals

that will provide a real guarantee of a new kind of dialectic between majority and opposition in the spirit of the alternative and to put forward increasingly specific and credible government solutions in the interests of the social forces which we address and in the more general interests of the country.

CSO: 3528/001

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

CDA'S BUKMAN ON RELATIONS WITH VVD, PVDa

Rotterdam HET VRIJE VOLK in Dutch 28 Aug 85 p 9

[Report on interview with CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) Chairman Piet Bukman by Yvonne Zonderop: "It Would be Decent to Talk with VVD (Peoples' Party for Freedom and Democracy) first"; date not given]

[Text] Sitting on a bed of roses. There is no other way the position of the CDA can be described at present. Earlier on the VVD and PvdA [Labor Party] reacted in a honeysweet manner to the draft election program of the christian democrats. Now that coalition partner VVD is announcing its plans for the future, comparable expressions of praise are not forthcoming, however. In an extremely critical manner, the CDA denounces the liberals' lack of social sensitivity. The unsuspecting voter might even get the impression that the CDA is no longer champing at the bit to merrily continue the current collaboration.

CDA Party Chairman Piet Bukman, usually not afraid of making bold statements, resembles tranquility itself when he is asked for an explanation. The "warm advocate of collaboration with the VVD," as opposition leader Den Uyl described Bukman in HET VRIJE VOLK not long ago, puts the fate of his party entirely in the hands of the voters. Let them decide what is to be done after 4 years of Lubbers. Loyalty to the VVD is wonderful, but the CDA's own image must not be allowed to suffer, according to Bukman in an interview with this paper.

[Bukman] "The policy of the Lubbers Cabinet has been successful. Unemployment is decreasing, the financing deficit has been reduced and investments are on the increase. Then one must ask oneself if one should continue in exactly the same manner. The CDA says: certain adjustments are justified. When the revision of the social security system is finished, we want a stable situation. People receiving benefits then have to know the score. I have the impression that the VVD then wants to economize even further on social security. That is not our line.



"Certainly, we want to continue Lubbers' policy for the most part. The VVD also says it wants to do that. But that still doesn't mean that you have to furnish the government accord with a CDA stamp saying: "this is our election program. The course can be adjusted. And then it is logical that VVD and CDA each opt for their own priority."

No snapping of fingers, no twitching of the harsh blue eyes. Friendly, but primarily decidedly, CDA Party Chairman Piet Bukman contends that the CDA's berating of its faithful coalition partner, the VVD, early this week was nothing unusual. "Hard-realistic," "attention to the weakest continues to be inadequate," "the blows fall on the benefit recipients," are just some of the phrases from the reaction the CDA parliamentary group had ready at the moment VVD leader Nijpels clarified his wishes for the future. Collaboration with the VVD has become even more difficult, parliamentary group leader De Vries confided to the KRO [Catholic Broadcasting Association] microphone. Then does that not indicate discord in the ranks?

The party advisor, present at the meeting, starts off. "Lately the impression has been created that the next government accord will be settled in just one afternoon if the CDA and VVD retain the majority. /Well, that is not the case."/

Chairman Bukman takes over the argument, as if by agreement. "I agree completely with parliamentary group leader De Vries. If the current government combination retains its majority, it is only logical and decent to talk with your coalition partner first and see if you can continue together. It is not a matter of shaking each others' hands one late afternoon and saying: fellows, we're continuing. No matter what, there will be a period in which you have to negotiate with each other.

"Ultimately one has to come to agreement, that is what is important. We won't automatically start governing with the PvdA either if the coalition loses the majority, which I don't expect, for that matter. There are obvious differences with the PvdA. And now they also appear to exist with the VVD. They always have existed. Only, now the idea has been evoked in the Netherlands that we were about to fuse together. And that is simply not the case."

Not One and the Same

[Question] In short, you are saying: we still agree more with the VVD than with the PvdA, but we want to make it clear for once that we are not one and the same.

Bukman: "Look, we have supported the course of the cabinet. That was good, and we must try to continue doing that. For that purpose I see more points in common with the VVD than with the PvdA. But that does not mean that you commit yourself in advance to the choice of a partner. Even if we want to continue with the VVD, the question arises: will you arrive at agreement."

[Question] Yet you say it is not sure that you will first talk with the PvdA if the coalition loses the majority.

Bukman: "I'm not saying that. I don't think it should be taken for granted that we will then govern with the PvdA. And that is what the Labor Party seems to suggest. They say: if this cabinet loses the majority, the CDA has no choice but to govern with the PvdA. On what do they base that? Surely first you have to come to agreement? I don't see collaboration with the PvdA as an easy road to tread."

[Question] Thus it will again be the VVD after all?

Bukman: "There are many differences between the CDA and VVD. For example, in the area of social security, the income policy, aid to industry, the media policy, euthanasia. You can't say: the differences with the VVD are greater than those with the PvdA. The areas in which we differ deviate. But, yes, it is indeed a political fact that we have been able to work very well with the VVD during the past years."

"In the coming 4 years they want to economize 18 to 20 billion guilders. I wonder, for example, what the effects of that will be on employment opportunity. The VVD does not put so much emphasis on shortening of the work week and on job-sharing. The economizations they propose in the government sector have no positive effect on employment opportunity. Those are issues we would have to discuss."

#### In All Directions

[Question] Yes, but, if, unless. The CDA can, and is willing, to go in all directions. Preferably with the VVD, but the differences are just as great as those with the PvdA. The CDA wants to continue the policy of the cabinet. But when the VVD submits an election program which appears to be a faithful copy of this cabinet's budget for next year, the coalition partner suddenly comes up with criticism. Are we wrong in saying that the VVD puts its words into action to a much greater extent when it says this policy needs to be continued?

Bukman: "I could set up that same argument in reverse. The cabinet has always said: by modifying the system we want to offer security once again to those entitled to benefits. Therefore the CDA says: let's not start cutting again later on. This cabinet has put emphasis on shortening of the work week and job sharing. You will also find that in bold print in the CDA program. You won't find that in the VVD. Thus, in some respects the VVD follows the government line more closely, and in others we do."

[Question] The fact remains, however, that the VVD reacted very amicably to your election program at the time, while you express criticism of their plans. Has the election fight definitely been launched with this?

Bukman: "Oh, I think that the fight was started when the CDA was the first to publicize its draft program. Meanwhile the desires of the three large parties are on the table. Now we first ought to await the assessment. I have the impression that especially the VVD program contains a number of 'loose ends.' And then the parties themselves will work on that. The last time about 1400

amendment proposals came on our draft program. That could lead to a considerable adjustment of the program."

[Question] But when you consider the reactions, surely the conclusion is that the CDA's situation is splendid, isn't it?

Bukman is unable to suppress a smile. "Well, I don't accept that conclusion. We'll have to fight to keep a good spot in the Dutch dispensation. We are not in a situation of being wooed by anyone. That is too simple a conception. First we have to see to it that we attract enough voters."

[Question] You don't present any argument with which you relativize the splendid position of the CDA.

Bukman: "Then what is that, that splendid position? That they can't get around us? That we are in a position to make demands? Well, I never see that as something so terribly wonderful. It always seems to me that the other parties' envy of us is greater than our enjoyment."

Not Terrible

Obviously it is not simple to come up with a well-substantiated denial of the position of power of the CDA. But what do you want. The Lubbers Cabinet was very successful. The retrenchment measures which were announced were all carried out, usually under the responsibility of CDA ministers. An effective CDA prime minister headed the team. The CDA [acted] as architect and executor of a sizeable economization program.

[Question] For what reason should like-minded voters still vote for the VVD? What exactly have the liberals contributed to those 4 years of restructuring?

Bukman: "Well, they were a coalition partner. I don't believe we could have done it alone. The CDA of course very consciously has chosen a line. Unpleasant things had to happen, and if you are convinced of that you must not act shy or make excuses. We have put ourselves behind that consistently and without hesitating. Therefore gradually the image has arisen that the heart of the cabinet is formed by the CDA. That the CDA is called the architect of this policy is a wonderful compliment. But it was carried by two parties, even though the CDA occupies more ministers posts which attract attention."

[Question] The CDA reaps the harvest while the VVD gave loyal support for a while.

Bukman: "Indeed, if you look at the polls, you'll see that so far the gain is being booked more by the CDA than by the VVD. We do form a stable element within the Dutch dispensation."

[Question] The collaboration is firm, yet now the CDA has such a rejective reaction toward the VVD program. Doesn't that confuse your following, the people who support this policy?

Bukman: "We have done nothing more with our program than simply make our own desires known. The VVD has also done that now. Well, so what if we are a little critical for once. I really don't find that so terrible."

[Question] The points on which the CDA is now offering criticism concern the social image of the VVD. Is this a nice opportunity for you to patch up your own damaged social image and to draw voters away from the PvdA?

#### Neither Meat Nor Fish

Bukman: "No, we react on the basis of our own priorities. In our draft program there are some rather essential views on the promotion of work opportunity, the purchasing power and benefits. We have come to the conclusion that those are important things. And then one will just have to wait and see what the electoral effect is. We don't want to entice voters with improper arguments."

The CDA has returned. Comfortably in the middle, neither bowing to the left nor to the right, as helmsman Van Agt used to say. Who votes for the CDA will not know with which party a government will be formed. Gone is all the clarity of past years.

Bukman: "But that's exactly what elections are for, to create clarity. That complaint is always thrown at us. But PvdA voters don't know at all whether their party will carry government responsibility after the elections. The same is true for the VVD. Since the PvdA and VVD so far have excluded each other as partners, we are always a government party. But it is not right to blame us for vagueness. Clarity is created by the voter."

[Question] In summary: if the coalition retains the majority, you will first talk with the VVD and otherwise first with the PvdA.

Bukman: "The expectation is that, when the polls come out, the largest party, thus the PvdA, is allowed to be the first to choose a discussion partner."

[Question] Just as in 1982, when ultimately a CDA-VVD cabinet rolled forth, as expected by everyone. No one thought at the time that the discussion between PvdA and CDA would succeed.

Bukman: "I don't agree. That suggests that no serious discussion was held with Van Kemenade. I deny that once and forever. We did not cheat."

[Question] Will you go into the discussions with the PvdA as seriously as in 1982? Or perhaps even more seriously?

Bukman: "Every party is committed to talk seriously with an informateur appointed by Her Majesty. But first you have to come to agreement. Once again, the election result is decisive. As a serious party, you must not minimize that."

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CSO: 3614/136



POLITICAL

NORWAY

LABOR PARTY, COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANS INTERPRET ELECTION RESULT

Labor Party Real Winner

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 10 Sep 85 p 4

[Editorial: "Election Victory"]

[Text] The trend of the election was clear as early as election eve. The Labor Party would have a good election. If it would be good enough to cause a government shift this time was more uncertain. Yet we do not hesitate to call the Labor Party the major winner of the election. Even though the non-socialist government is getting a clear signal from the voters to continue, the government is embarking on a shaky voyage. With a scant majority in the Storting, a weakened Christian People's Party [KRF], an equally weak Center Party [SP] and the Progressive Party [FRP] in the balance, it is a question of how long the government cooperation will hold. The Labor Party [AP] must remain prepared and ready to take over during the period.

There are a number of causes for AP's brilliant election result. In this election the party organization functioned better than it has for a long time. There has been steadily growing enthusiasm throughout the party. Both the party leadership and the countless women and men in party steward positions have made an impressive contribution to change the party from a predicted election loser to a confident winner. The party leader herself, Gro Harlem Brundtland, conducted a campaign which made an impression far outside the ranks of the party. If the election trends hold to the end, they will confirm that her contribution has had results.

If the final result--despite the strong AP advance--gives the Willoch government a green light to stagger on with FRP and Carl I. Hagen in the balance, many commentators will claim that the AP lost the election but won the election campaign. In that case it will be a faulty analysis. The future will show that AP has also won the election, even though the change of government will not take place just now.

Even though we are pleased with the inspiration and contribution which the party leadership, party organization and election workers have made in this

election campaign, and even though all this is tremendously important, it is not the main cause of AP's election success. The main cause is to be found in the program and the policy that the party has offered to the voters. This is a policy which has taken time to form. Behind the results is the contribution of tens of thousands of party members. An active labor movement has also played a part.

The Labor Party won the election because in this election campaign the party has primarily put the policies and issues in focus. Throughout the campaign the party has shown its best side. AP is never as strong as when the party has issues to fight for which are really important for weak groups in society. AP is strongest when the party seeks the government position in order to realize reforms which will give us a more just society, in which people experience a more equal and just distribution of resources, possibilities and rights. It was therefore that AP was at its best when this year they came into the election campaign with special weight on three election promises: fight for full employment, better health and social policies, and better care for the elderly.

The election result shows that the voters have understood the message and have confidence in the Labor Party.

#### Communist Paper Sees Lessons

Oslo FRIHETER in Norwegian 10 Sep 85 p 5

[Editorial: "NKP Must Chisel Out a Clearer Profile"]

[Text] There is no reason to be satisfied. Willoch is still in office. And NKP has had its worst election outcome ever. That means that the struggle for peace and labor in the next 4 years will be at least as difficult and demanding as it has been so far. It also means that NKP [Norwegian Communist Party] must chisel out a clearer political profile in order to reverse the trend toward decline and voter flight.

The election was largely marked by tactical voting--a Gro and Kare election as it were. The Labor Party wanted it to be an election between itself and the Conservatives, and to push aside the unified issues of the Left. We now know the results. It did not work. But it could have worked. If the Labor Party had not tried to grab it all for themselves.

"If we are to prevent the same thing from happening again, NKP must have a sharper political profile," said the chairman of the Oslo party, Paul Midtlyng in a comment to FRIHETEN. He said that the Oslo communists showed a dawning interest in their policy at the schools and at the election campaign headquarters in central Oslo.

"Therefore we must not hide our revolutionary goals under a bushel, but on the contrary develop our recommendations and forms of action which emphasize our character in relation to the other parties," said Paul Midtlyng.

The Labor Party must endure bitter criticism because before the election the party was neither willing to join a more just election arrangement nor a technical election cooperation agreement.

Also the Liberal and Socialist Left Parties experienced a frustrating moment as the arithmetic in TV House made it clear that another election arrangement or a closer technical election cooperation on the Left indicated clearly a socialist victory and a change of government.

"This arithmetic must lead to an internal debate in the Labor Party," said the chairman of the Socialist Left Party, Theo Koritzinsky to NTB [NORSK TELEGRAMBYRA].

"It is obvious that the lack of cooperation on the Left may have destroyed the chance for a new government," said Koritzinsky.

"We are working for a new election arrangement with mandates for equalization and we are going to adhere to today's rules for cooperation on lists in the expectation of something better," said the chairman of the Socialist Left Party.

Liberal Party chairman Odd Einar Dorum was not elated either by the estimates of technical election cooperation between the nonsocialist parties.

"If the Labor Party as the only party in the Storting had not opposed a new election arrangement, the Liberal Party would have been well represented in the new parliament, and the government would be in the hands of the Labor Party and its cooperating parties," said Dorum.

9287

CSO: 3639/171

POLITICAL

NORWAY

CHILL IN RELATIONS WITH POLAND EASED AFTER FAMILIES UNITED

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Sep 85 p 11

[Article by Kjell Dragnes: "Norway and Poland on Speaking Terms Again"]

[Text] Norway and Poland are resuming the political consultations which have been held in abeyance since 1981 when the state of emergency began. Undersecretary Thorbjorn Froysnes will travel to Warsaw on 6 October to have conversations with Vice Foreign Minister Ernest Kucza, on both bilateral questions and East-West relations.

The solution of the Knihinicki case contributed greatly to the normalization of relations between Poland and Norway, but also the reuniting of other families will be discussed during the visit in Warsaw. Undersecretary Froysnes does not want to discuss which issues are involved. The discussion about exit permission for Waldemar Knihinicki's family took place in an exchange of letters between Froysnes and Kucza.

Another question which will be discussed is the Polish debt. The Ministry of Trade has recently negotiated an agreement for delaying Poland's payments to Norway involving 600 million kroner. But Norwegian firms say that Poland owes more than that amount. Economic cooperation has suffered as a result of Poland's problems, and the trade has halved in 3 years.

Froysnes said, "Norwegian authorities see it as very important to have contacts with the East European countries in the period before the summit meeting in Geneva between the Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan. The visit to Poland is a step in this direction."

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CSO: 3639/171



POLITICAL

SWEDEN

# ELECTION IMPACT ON VPK, LIBERAL PARTY, CENTER'S FALLDIN

## Communists in Bargaining Position

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Sep 85 p 2

[Commentary by Nils-Eric Sandberg: "What Can the Government Offer for VPK's Voting Support?"]

[Text] The Social Democrats lost seven seats in the election. They thereby lost their majority in the Riksdag (and also became dependent on the votes of the Communist Left Party [VPK] for government proposals).

"This is an enormous victory," said the prime minister on election night.

(He has also said that one should call things by their right name. That was in another context.)

Previously the Social Democrats [S] had more seats than the nonsocialists; that was also true when VPK declined to vote. Now the VPK must vote for government proposals if they are to go through the Riksdag.

Naturally VPK will not want to bring down a "workers' government." The question will therefore be what conditions the VPK will demand, and receive, in order to vote for even those government proposals they do not like.

The balance of trade is now showing a greater deficit. It is more than the economy can tolerate. The government must therefore economize. There are two main methods: increase interest rates or increase taxes, primarily the MOMS [value added tax]. Last spring they chose to increase interest rates (because the election campaign had begun, and increased interest appeared to be less than an increased MOMS). But higher interest increases the cost of businesses' import of investment and investment goods, and if industry is to expand its imports must be free of restrictions.

Also private consumption (which now makes up 17 percent of imports) must be suppressed. The most effective means in the short term is to increase the MOMS.

And the VPK has given a very definite "no" to an increase in the MOMS.

So what can the party demand in exchange? What are going to be the terms of the offer when Lars Werner is invited for coffee and cookies at a cabinet meeting?

In an interview in SVENSKA DAGBLADET on September 19 the VPK party secretary Kenneth Kvist reported some of the communist's main issues:

A special tax to draw in one percent of firms' liquidity to the state (which will "create" 10,000-15,000 new jobs with the money); the rules for the investment funds will be sharpened; employers' contributions and sales profit tax and sales taxes on stock shares will be raised--etc. Corporation taxes will also be changed in the progressive direction. During periods with higher profits the state should levy a one-time fee on the firms.

For a party which for ideological reasons wants to damage business and the market economy these demands are reasonable.

A tax on business liquidity will, like other taxes and "fees," be mainly borne by the consumers (through higher prices) and/or the wage earners (through lower wages). Stock dividends represent only about one and one-quarter percent of wage costs.

To the extent that taxes are paid in the short term by businesses, they reduce the capacity for investments and thereby indirectly future industrial employment. Even if the state finances public works with taxes, it does not need to give any net contribution to employment. The tax only means that the state is moving money and demand from industry to the public sector.

It is easy to criticize the communist issues with purely economic, nonpolitical arguments.

The problem is that the same objections can be directed against similar measures which the government has introduced or is considering. Six percent of the wage sum in excess of 20 million will in this budget year be locked into the "liquidity fund" in the National Bank. Since the allocation is obligatory and the interest is only half of the market interest, this liquidity fund functions as a tax on business--with the same effect as VPK's liquidity tax. When high interest rates on the credit market force firms to finance a relatively large part of investments with profits, taxes on liquidity can slow business investments. And that is what we live off of in the long run.

The state now ties up in one year in renewal and liquidity funds almost 12 billion kronor. The state therefore draws in a part of the profits that the firms make during good business times which the firms need as a buffer for times when business is not good. Therefore corporation taxes lack any symmetry with the business cycle.

A sales tax on shares of stock is an old VPK demand. Kjell-Olof Feldt has indicated that he wants to raise the sales profit tax on stock shares, although not (yet) as much as VPK demands.

It looks like VPK will be able to get some good offers for its voting support.

On the other hand perhaps the Riksdag majority will be hesitant about a VPK demand to (in a democratic way) introduce the dictatorship of the proletariat.

### Liberals' 'Long Road Back'

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Sep 85 p 8

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "The Liberal Party's Long Way Back"]

[Text] Liberal Party [FP] leader Bengt Westerberg will face hard parliamentary tests following the party's smashing victory in the Riksdag election. In order to win government power in 1988 and become the prime minister, Westerberg must hold the three nonsocialist parties together and at the same time show an FP profile as a market oriented but socially responsible party. This balancing act will not permit the slightest flirtation with the Palme government.

Bengt Westerberg's key parliamentary role in the newly elected Riksdag is facilitated by the fact that Conservative Party [M] leader Ulf Adelsohn is badly ruffled by the election outcome. At the same time internal criticism is coming out against Center Party [SP] leader Thorbjorn Falldin, which weakens the position of SP.

Bengt Westerberg's leading role in the nonsocialist opposition does not therefore need to be questioned, despite his modest parliamentary experience. He has only one year in the Riksdag behind him.

In his immediate circle, however, Bengt Westerberg has Liberal Party politicians with wide experience, both in government work and work in the Riksdag. Members of that group include Jan-Erik Wikstrom, Ingemar Eliasson, Birgit Friggebo and Bjorn Molin.

Bengt Westerberg's election campaign was characterized by his reasonable style, and he can not abandon this as a leading opposition politician.

The proposals which the Palme government will present to the Riksdag must therefore be proved on their own merits. If the minority Palme government presents proposals which are suitable to FP, Westerberg will politely say thanks and receive them. Demonstration politics does not fit his style.

Westerberg can not afford any direct discussions with the Palme government on this and that. That would cause neoliberal attacks from the Right. The

risk is great that in such an event the FP would be halved again.

The election success was won by an antisocialist policy of harsh criticism of the wage earner funds and stealthy socialization, and of harsh anti-communism. Bengt Westerberg can try to calm his incurable longing back to Government House.

It is a long and crooked road which in an almost unbelievable way brought FP back to today's leading position in the nonsocialist opposition.

After Bertil Ohlin's time in power the FP considered a change of government to be more important than anything. The ideological impoverishment which resulted led to one election loss after another.

Middle party cooperation between FP and SP at the end of the 60's was begun to tie SP closer to the nonsocialist block. SP leader Gunnar Hedlund was in a coalition with the Social Democrats 1951-57, which was enough to prevent a repetition.

It became the dominant goal of FP to bring the parties of the middle together. When "the time is ripe," said Gunnar Hedlund.

But SP was only interested in gaining FP's votes--political cannibalism--and to penetrate the big cities without criticism from the large liberal press.

Afterward the SP acquired a strong position in both Stockholm and Goteborg with several Riksdag seats. But when the "Uppsala meeting" at the beginning of the 70's was to decide on the planned party union, Gunnar Hedlund failed to appear since the SP Youth League and Women's League did not agree.

FP leader Gunnar Helen, eager instigator of union, got an earful that he will not soon forget. Beginning with this year's election SP no longer has as many voters in the big cities, so the situation has gone back to that of the 50's.

The first common three-party leader interview took place before the 1968 election with Gunnar Hedlund, Sven Weden and Yngve Holmberg (M), the first common nonsocialist press conference with Gunnar Helen, Thorbjorn Falldin and Gosta Bohman took place in November 1971.

The ardently desired change of government took place in 1976, and then came Ullsten's FP government in 1978, then a three-party government and finally the two-party government of Falldin-Ullsten.

On energy questions the FP made up with the Social Democrats on 12 nuclear power plants. Palme jumped off following the accident at Harrisburg. In 1981 Falldin-Ullsten made up with Palme on taxes, but the agreement broke down when LO [Federation of Trade Unions] applied pressure.



After this attempt the FP shipwreck commission in 1983 confirmed that the lack of a profile and credibility made the party vulnerable. The attempt to create broad unity in Swedish politics, which was in line with the one-chamber Riksdag reform, had badly wounded public opinion on FP.

When Bengt Westerberg became FP leader in 1983 he emphasized from the beginning FP's market-liberal position. Then he continued to emphasize that FP wanted to create a nonsocialist three-party government.

Westerberg thereby pulled the ground out from under the usual Conservative criticism of wobbling and unreliability. Everyone who glanced over the block border toward the Social Democrats was designated a deserter by M.


After Westerberg took over power FP published one report after the other, and the party leader learned all the missions like a computer. For the first time in a long time FP created a stable basis to stand on.

At an early stage in the election campaign an increasing interest in FP could be detected, but not even Westerberg himself could dare expect more than eight percent in the election.

In retrospect it can be seen that Westerberg's calculations were realistic. His maiden speech in the Riksdag was marked by moderation and reason, and that was his winning line in the election campaign.

This year's opinion polls have established that there were one million undecided voters as late as last spring. For these undecided voters Bengt Westerberg stood out as a saving angel, a political deliverer.

Westerberg represented a fresh and unexpended power. It was appropriate to jump quickly onto his bandwagon, powerfully driven by the magical power of opinion polls.



Caption: Election results for the Liberal Party 1948-1985. The road back to a leadership position has been long and crooked for the Liberal Party. The change of party leaders was also frequent during the 60's and 70's. After the takeover of power by Westerberg the party has, for the first time in a long time, a stable and positive basis to stand on.

#### Paper Examines Falldin's Position

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Sep 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Must Falldin Step Down?"]

[Text] Immediately following the fourth election defeat in a row there appears to be a real internal debate in SP. The previous hardly noticeable dissatisfaction with the party's profile, viewpoints on certain questions and the party leader is now gushing forth. Previously the party leadership has avoided a more penetrating debate. This time it will not work.

The parallel with FP's unsuccessful 1982 election is obvious. SP has lost over the entire country. And in every situation. The party has not been successful in convincing of its reliability, its sincerity on environmental questions or its role as representative of the little people. The change on the question of illness money made the party's economic position unclear. Thorbjorn Falldin's reluctance toward every form of common nonsocialist manifestation concerned the average nonsocialist voter. But the workers and handworkers, whom Falldin tried to hold in order to avoid lining up too closely with M, probably still went over to S.

Obviously SP lost the most in its strongholds in western Sweden, for example in Halland and Skaraborg counties. Those are the counties where S has grown the most in the country.

Lack of clarity in the political message and wavering on the political issues (illness money, food MOMS) are now pointed out by the critics as the reasons for the defeat. They can also point out two concrete decisions which were negative for SP. One was the Dagmar reform concerning choice of doctors. The party never succeeded in advancing the important part of the reform: to distribute health insurance costs justly over the country. Instead attention was drawn to the negative aspect, that the free choice of doctors would be interfered with. That has certainly played a part in SP's catastrophe in the big cities.

Cooperation with the Christian Democratic Union [KDS] has strongly contributed to this catastrophe. Not only because the KDS agreement gave the impression of playing tricks with the constitutional law, but perhaps also even more that sympathizers on environmental questions, mostly women, found the KDS view of the family and women's work entirely too foreign. SP family policy, which still tends to patronize the housewife, is connected with the more permanent KDS line.

SP has therefore succeeded at the art of being both too unclear, since the party wants to satisfy many groups, and too clear on a couple of issues. Dissatisfaction from the districts is now turning against the defeated party chairman Thorbjorn Falldin. From several quarters, Dalarna and Skaraborg and the newspaper GOTLANNINGEN in Visby, his departure is demanded. In other quarters they are critical, but more restrained.

Nothing would be improved if the party leader departed. The experience of the FP should teach the SP something. Defeat has led to a change of party leaders without resulting in a long term improvement. The most important thing is to first carefully discuss the goals and the direction of the party movement. When that process is complete it is appropriate to find the best possible leader. The FP debate following the election of 1982 took one year. But first the future policy had to begin to clarify and a common party leader candidate had to be established.

The SP must now first discuss its role in politics. Will it be a nonsocialist party with certain reflections of rural life and agriculture, an interest party of agriculture and forestry and small business or an idea party with shades of environment, smallness and future responsibility? Will the party be a party which works for a nonsocialist majority or a reaction party which cooperates across block boundaries?

Desires within SP are pulling today in different directions. It is important that the debate be conducted calmly and quietly. A quick decision on choice of routes or a hasty attempt to remove Falldin would only further damage the party.

The only possibility for SP to stop its decline is to create clarity on the party's course. As its policy appears after 10 years confrontation, no non-socialist party can act as a support party for S without signing its own death warrant. SP can come back as a nonsocialist party of the little people. Involvement in environment and decentralization, more significant than before, can give the party a special profile.

Thorbjorn Falldin has a personal firmness, a positive impact and an eye for political reality which makes him a leader figure, which SP and Swedish politics needs. But if he is to shed the stamp of defeat, he must contribute to the review which is required within the Center Party.

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CSO: 3650/2



POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

BELATED SOVIET APOLOGY NOTED--As the head of the political section of the Foreign Ministry indicated, the Soviet apology for the airplane intrusion over Gotland in June is a satisfactory sign. In view of what has unfortunately come to be regarded as normal behavior on the part of the superpower the immediate reaction is to regard this sudden conciliatory move as a gesture of good will. But it is deplorable that the Soviet pursuit of a Swedish passenger plane in 1984 has never been cleared up. Cynics will ask themselves whether the Soviet Union waited to make this announcement until the Swedish election was over and the Palme government had won re-election. The Swedish defense staff and the Foreign Ministry did not regard the incident as a "serious" one, which probably made acknowledgement a little easier. At any rate it is a plus for Swedish diplomacy that a belated admission has been made. Sweden must never stop protesting when violations occur. In this case persistence paid off. [Editorial: "Soviet Apology"] [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Sep 85 p 2] 6578

CSO: 3650/4

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## EVOLUTION OF NAVAL TASK FORCE AIR DEFENSE DOCTRINE, SYSTEMS

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 85 pp 103-107

[Article by Comm Reinhold Siebert: "Air Defense in the Navy: With the Example of a Task Force at Sea"]

[Text] The danger of missiles in naval warfare became publicly known for the first time in 1967 when the Egyptians sank the Israeli destroyer "Eilat" using Soviet STYX missiles from KOMAR fast patrol boats. The ship losses during the Falkland conflict confirm in a spectacular manner the fact that the missile has developed into the main air threat in maritime operations. Therefore, to speak of air defense in a task force also means involving oneself extensively with antimissile defense. Proceeding from the threat, Commander Reinhold Siebert from the command Naval Command Systems in Wilhelmshaven describes the tactical and technical aspects of air defense.

### Tasks

To fulfill their defense mission, German naval forces are employed, among other things, in the form of task forces. A task force, composed, as a rule, of four or five destroyers and frigates, can receive the mission of securing waters against the intrusion of enemy submarines and surface naval forces or of blocking straits. It can also be utilized for the direct protection of military or civilian convoys against attacks from the air or surface units as well as by submarines.

### Air Threat

If one considers the capabilities of the naval forces and naval aviation of the Warsaw Pact, then one must come to the conclusion that a permanent high air threat must be assumed in the operational area of the German Navy. Large parts of it lie within the operational radii of up-to-date high-performance aircraft that can attack naval forces with bombs and rockets under practically all weather conditions. An even greater threat results from guided missiles that can be fired from numerous aircraft, surface units, submerged or surfaced submarines as well as from ground units.

The range of these missiles is between a few and several hundred kilometers. With the exception of the missile-carrying aircraft, practically all other platforms are dependent upon external target data if they are to use the full range of their missiles, for their own position-finding means do not cover the required distances. This external locating is performed by aircraft and helicopters but also by forward naval forces that convey target values to the missile carriers by means of automatic data or video transmission.

The speed of the missiles varies from high subsonic speed to several Mach.

As for the flight profile, the palette ranges from the missile flying close to the water--the so-called seaskimmer--to missiles that fly at an altitude of more than 10 kilometers and then descend at a steep angle.

The clearest difference in the missiles is in their guidance, which fundamentally can be divided into remote-controlled and self-guiding systems. The most usual way of guiding a missile to the target is the active radar search head. That is, the missile has its own radar equipment that is activated after a preprogramed flight time and that independently acquires and heads for the target. In addition, there is the possibility of guiding the missile to the target by means of a radio command from the firing platform or of activating the radar search head of the missile and acquiring the target before the missile has left the carrier system. Finally, still another passive search method must be mentioned, in which the missile uses the radar beams and thermal radiation emanating from the target as guidance information to the point of impact.

If one assumes that the attack takes place with aircraft and different missiles in a coordinated manner--that is, almost simultaneously--from various directions and in large numbers, then it becomes clear what sort of complex task air defense faces in a formation.

#### Air Defense in a Task Force

Air defense at sea is understood as the employment of on-board sensors and effectors against all types of air threats. That means concentration of the sensors and effectors of the task force for a coordinated and well-directed self-defense or to protect units that have been entrusted to it against attacks from the air.

Before the formation commander takes measures for air defense in the formation, he has the following general points to consider:

--The law of action and the initiative are in favor of the attacker. He determines the timing, plan and course of the attack.

--The locating range of the formation is limited, so that an attack from the air cannot be detected until late and therefore only a little time remains for defensive measures. To be sure, the formation's own helicopters can increase the locating range but this gain in time is almost completely consumed by the slow forwarding of information because of the lack of data transmission.

--In the navy's operational area, one must assume a constant air threat. One cannot determine a clear direction of the threat. The measures for air defense must allow for an all-around defense.

--As a rule, air defense is not the main operational mission of the task force. Therefore, the air defense measures must also permit the fulfillment of the actual mission.

These aspects must be considered when the defense measures are planned and established for the individual phases of the air attack. An air attack can be subdivided into the phases reconnaissance and deployment, determination of target data, and attack.

In the first phase, the formation commander in our navy has no means of mitigating the looming attack or of making it impossible. Here it is a matter for the operational level to hinder the operational mission of the assembling ship formations through fighter bomber sorties and to have the air defense organization engage approaching enemy aircraft.

In the phase of the determination of target data, the formation commander can do some things to make it more difficult for the enemy to get a picture of the situation for target selection. For this purpose, a formation disposition can be chosen that will not directly indicate a warship formation and that will not allow the detection of targets worthy of protection. At the same time, of course, there must be a continuation of reciprocal protection against attacks. Characteristic electromagnetic emissions must be reduced to a minimum so as not to serve as an aid in identification. This disguising can be increased even further through frequent station changes as well as by putting out decoys.

During the attack phase itself, the main defensive effort shifts from tactical measures to the actual employment of weapons. Because of the rapid course of the attack, little time remains for independent decisions. Only preplanned and largely automatically initiated defensive measures permit a timely engagement.

The essential element of a successful defense is the earliest possible identification of approaching missiles to allow the establishment of an engagement tailored to the missile type with several hit fronts, thereby raising the prospects of success. The course of each individual engagement should thereby include the coordinated use of missiles and tube weapons and provide for supporting interference and deception measures.

This sketchy description of defensive measures against air attacks makes clear that the defender is always under extreme time pressure, for limited locating ranges on the one hand and high missile speeds on the other allow for engagement times of only a few seconds to a couple of minutes at most.

This puts high demands on the tactician and the technician. On the one hand, it is necessary for the tactician to work out principles. On the other hand, the technician must develop sensors and effectors that are up to the enemy's



technical challenges. The common goal of the efforts must be the early recognition of an acute threat so that passive and active engagement can be successfully carried out in time. In the search for an effective defense, passive and active means should not be in competition but must complement one another. A sufficiently high probability of success can only be achieved when as many resources and measures as possible are employed simultaneously and in a coordinated manner.

#### Position-Finding Resources and Weapons for Air Defense in a Task Force

##### Radar equipment

- SPS 40
- SPS 52
- SPS 10
- SGR 114
- SGR 105
- SGR 103
- DA 08
- WM 25

##### Fire control systems

- MK 74
- MK 86
- M 4
- STIR
- WM 25

##### Electronic warfare

- WLR 1
- FL 1800
- Breda (chaff dispenser)
- SRBOC (chaff dispenser)

##### Weapons

##### Missile systems

- Standard missile
- NATO Sea Sparrow
- RAM

##### Artillery calibers

- 127 mm
- 100 mm
- 76 mm
- 40 mm

##### Tactical aspects

The tactical measures for air defense can be summarized as follows:

- Disguising

In this connection, it is a matter of using tactical and technical means to make it more difficult for the enemy to get a picture of the situation.

#### --Delegation of responsibility

Rapidly changing air defense situations do not always permit a central command based upon the actual situation. Here command responsibility is reflected in part in the careful preparation of preplanned reactions to the most varied threats. The initiation and implementation of these defensive measures is shifted to the lowest possible responsibility level down to the operator. Combat is controlled and managed in that the ship and formation commands limit themselves to the suspension of unsuitable measures.

This type of command in the formation also presupposes secure and rapid communications and data links as well as computer-controlled command and weapons employment systems (FueWES) so that the large amount of dissimilar information can be rapidly processed, relayed and promptly displayed in the proper form.

#### --Defense in depth

In addition, defensive measures are to be assembled that are echeloned in depth and that operate right up to the immediate vicinity of the units. They cover formation and self-defense weapons. Formation weapons include fighter aircraft assigned to the formation, long and medium-range air defense missiles and equipment for electronic interference and deception measures. Self-defense weapons include close and very close range air defense missile systems as well as tube weapons. They can be controlled for automatic defensive reactions by means of the FueWES installed on board.

#### Technical Aspects

To begin with, it must be stated that the outlay for such air defense systems increases with increasing target density and speed along with the shorter reaction times that are thereby necessary.

Up-to-date electronic warfare systems are expected to detect the electromagnetic radiation of all enemy radar sets almost simultaneously, analyzing it extremely rapidly and assigning it to the proper radiation source. In addition, they should have at their disposal a large number of means for interference and deception so that they can also blind or deflect radar with complex signal processing.

Radar sensors with an increased detection range, a high resolving capability, and considerable jamming resistance are a prerequisite for successful engagement. In the future, shorter reaction times can be expected by combining fire-control tracking channels with air surveillance radar to form the so-called multifunctional radar. To improve the probability of detection, greater use must be made of optronic sensors, even if their range varies greatly with weather conditions.

To keep pace with the improved locating possibilities, the weapons must also be improved. The increase in range and the improved probability of hits may suffice here to represent many individual requirements.

#### Data Processing in Support of Air Defense

But higher target densities, increased detection ranges, more efficient weapons, and a swifter flow of events also mean a rapid increase in information that must be evaluated, compressed and finally processed and monitored by people.

This is where the on-board command and weapon employment system is important. It includes all equipment, installations and subsystems that support the command and weapon employment. The core of the system is its computer components as well as display and access equipment, also called person-machine interface. Its task is to make possible an assessment of the situation through the provision of a continually updated picture of the situation as well as to guarantee a prompt, effective and coordinated employment of all sensors and effectors under real-time conditions. The acting intelligence is anchored in the command and weapon employment program. Its task, through the meaningful combination of automatic operating sequences, tactical recommendations, instructions and operator-supported control measures, is to raise the overall performance of the system beyond the sum of the performance of the components, to support and accelerate the command process, and to relieve and reduce operating personnel.

To make this abstract description a little more graphic, I would like to go into some areas that are important for air defense and in which software solutions are still pending or are in need of improvement.

In the first place, there is the area of the development of a situation description. Although extensive software packages have already been applied here, progress offers more and more possibilities to achieve improvements in this area.

In this connection, considerable weight is attached to the automatic concentration of sensor data, together with a largely automatic correlation of the information from various sensors, to achieve an acceleration of the identification process.

The increasing application of color monitors also has an influence on the display of the situation description. Here, for the transition from unicolored to multicolored display, operator-favorable solutions must be found. The most dangerous threats, for example, can be especially accentuated in an optically meaningful way without having the overall situation recede too far into the background.

The engagement of threats automatically with the help of computers is another area in which better solutions are being sought.

The goal of this software function must be to give the ship command decisionmaking tools for the employment of weapons in changing threat situations without having the various sensors and effectors preclude one another's actions. In complex situations with a large number of targets, the software must offer decisionmaking tools whose result is to recommend to the system user which targets are to be engaged with which combinations of sensors and weapons in which sequence. The required measures to initiate and carry out the engagement are to be handled automatically by the program unless the user orders a change.

The same demand on the software results from the point of view of the coordination of air defense in a formation. One must thereby not only undertake a target distribution oriented toward the different defensive systems on the individual units but also the employment of formation weapons must be echeloned in depth and the use of chaff as well as deception and jamming transmitters must be coordinated chronologically.

Reciprocal interference and interactions of the effectors and the endangering of one's own formation are to be avoided.

In addition to the on-going computations, the software must transform computation results into orders and issue them to the other units over data links, analyze readiness reports, and prepare all information as a basis for a decision in a form that is clear to the user. And all of this must be done under real-time conditions, that is, with no noticeable time lag.

This crude functional description may illustrate that the effectiveness of software models for such complex tasks must be tested through many studies and computational series before the models are suitable for use in air defense. There is still much work to be done.

The comments on the capabilities of the command and weapon sumployment programs could easily give the impression that air defense takes place fully automatically. That is not so and neither is it planned that way. The employment of weapons in a task force must be handled flexibly if it is to be successful. The system user must be able to intervene in an automatism and change operational sequences at any time. Rigid automatisms can easily be grasped by the enemy and therefore can quickly turn out to be an inappropriation reaction. The software must therefore be designed so that it does not restrict the freedom of action of the operators. It offers assistance, provides support and gives recommendations for the weapon selection. The user decides.

Tactical and technical means must be used for a successful air defense within a task force at sea. The capabilities of the individual weapon systems are brought to bear in a coordinated manner by the formation commander. In this connection, real-time data links and the decisionmaking tools and recommendations for weapon employment given by the command and weapon employment systems constitute an important support function.

Tactics and weapon and sensor technology as well as the support of data processing must be improved continually if naval task forces wish to be



successful in carrying out their operational mission under substantial threats from the air.

In the development of components, it is especially important that they be conceived so that they can be integrated smoothly into existing functional chains and so that their adaptation can keep pace with the quantitative and qualitative changes in the threat.

9746

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE AUTHOR ATTACKS BOOK ON SUB INCIDENTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Sep 85 p 3

[Op Ed Article by Wilhelm Agrell]

[Text] Radical and awkward questions are very important in a debate involving intricate problems of interpretation. But when these questions are raised using the kind of methods Myhrberg resorts to the result is not only useless but directly harmful to the debate. That is what peace and conflict researcher Wilhelm Agrell says in a review of "Submarine Waltz" by Ingemar Myhrberg.

With the running aground of the U-137 in October 1981 and the big submarine hunt in Harsfjarden a year later Sweden entered a foreign and security policy crisis that specifically revolved around our relations with the Soviet Union and our ability to maintain our territorial integrity in peacetime as well as wartime. This crisis has set a definite mark on the security policy debate in Sweden and the way in which foreign and defense policy issues are handled.

Since the beginning of 1984 the Swedish government has sought to improve or, if one prefers, normalize our relations with the Soviet Union. Following Olof Palme's speech at the Social Democratic Party congress on 17 September 1984 in which he stressed the need for a dialogue that was not based on violations and conflicts this process has continued against a background of increasing nonpartisan agreement.

In early August Sweden was visited by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Maltsev and Swedish-Soviet relations were described by both sides as basically good and normal. Thus on the diplomatic level the submarine crisis is a thing of the past as far as Sweden is concerned.

What is happening along our coast is less clear. Undersecretary Pierre Schori referred in connection with Maltsev's visit to a downward trend in reports of violations and said that 1985 had so far been the calmest year yet. There are not many reports in the mass media today about submarine

hunts and when they do appear most of the space is devoted to denials by the defense system. Behind this is a change in information policy aimed at saying as little as possible publicly while the unofficial picture may be quite different.

This is also reflected in the occasional reports of incidents issued by OB [Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces] in which the language and the evaluation procedures have changed substantially following the unsuccessful submarine hunt off Karlskrona in 1984. It is obvious that the crisis of confidence the defense organization experienced, with the need to be able to present concrete evidence, has led to such a cautious attitude that the OB reports on submarine violations are almost totally lacking in substance. No one can demand proof of what he says, but no outsider can understand what is going on either.

This has undeniably created a general feeling of uncertainty. Are the violations continuing? And does the defense organization really know what it is dealing with? In connection with the Harsfjarden hunt the military reaped the consequences of an information policy that was much too open and too hasty. Now there is a risk that it will suffer the consequences of exaggerated secretiveness and caution.

One of the things that has happened is the resurrection of what might be called the radical criticism of the official picture of the violations. In the 1960's and 1970's the navy was often criticized for exaggerating reports of violations on suitable occasions in an effort to create a favorable climate for higher appropriations. The U-137 incident ended the remarks about "budget submarines" but in the last year and a half the radical criticism has started to surface again with questions being raised about various central elements in the reports on submarine violations.

In the spring of 1984 there was an intensive debate in DAGENS NYHETER concerning the circumstances that led the U-137 to run aground and journalist Anders Hasselbohm published a book in which he sharply criticized the Submarine Defense Commission's conclusions with regard to the Harsfjarden incident. The criticism led to a sharp reaction which in many cases was aimed at the fact that the criticism had been made at all and at questions about who benefited from it. In a democratic perspective radical questions are both legitimate and necessary, of course. It is important that people dare to ask these critical questions and they must be answered seriously. The fact that the radical criticism may not stand up later on is another matter.

It is on this basis that one should study Ingemar Myhrberg's book, "Submarine Waltz," which is based in part on the earlier submarine debate.

Myhrberg's thesis is a very broad one, namely that "the Swedish military organization in its eagerness to raise defense appropriations combined with an almost paranoid attitude toward a nearby superpower has succeeded in duping, deceiving and misleading not only itself but an entire nation as well." According to Myhrberg this is "probably the biggest scandal there has ever been in modern Swedish history."

There is no real evidence to support this thesis in the book which consists mainly of criticism of the soundness of various submarine reports, especially the official version of the U-137 and Harsfjorden incidents.

Most of what Myhrberg says about the U-137 incident is a repeat of what he said in the DAGENS NYHETER debate in the spring of 1984: that there was no reasonable motive for a deliberate intrusion, that several witnesses heard the sub coming in with its diesel engines running and that a navigational error could have been caused by deviations in the gyrocompass. Myhrberg has changed the deviating gyrocompass theory several times in the course of the debate to fit the facts as they became known.

In connection with the 1984 debate the course settings given in the sub's logbook were released and they indicated a completely plausible course in the direction of the navigable channel in which the sub later ran aground. In view of this evidence and Myhrberg's remarkable assumptions about the deviating gyrocompass his conclusions about the U-137 incident are not very convincing.

When it comes to Harsfjorden and the Submarine Commission, Myhrberg's criticisms include charges of incompetence and dishonesty that are very similar to the charges made by Anders Hasselbohm a year ago. The important difference is that while Hasselbohm tried to prove that NATO subs had also been involved in Harsfjorden, Myhrberg, in line with his general thesis, maintains that there were not subs in the area at all.

The core of his argument focuses on bottom tracks the navy found in its subsequent investigation which were linked to two types of minisubs and one conventional mother sub. Myhrberg says that these tracks were actually made by the Swedish Navy's own submarines and that the tracks supposedly left by a vessel using caterpillar treads were made by older Swedish subs with two propellers, tracks that were preserved for many years in the sediment on the bottom.

Myhrberg's theory on this point is remarkable. The tread marks that turn aside for a rock are explained by Myhrberg as depth charge shock waves that bounced off the rock. But the tread marks (of the same type) around the keel impression of a conventional submarine near Danziger Gatt were supposedly caused by the propeller wash from a Hajen sub of a type in service until 1978. A basic requirement for a hypothesis that is worth examining is that it fits all the phenomena to be explained, not just some of them. It is unreasonable to claim that shock waves from a depth charge and the wash from a Hajen submarine would leave identical marks.

There are many other objections that could be made with regard to Myhrberg's presentation which consistently advances a single thesis. A pamphlet of this kind might make a convincing first impression on a reader who encounters a flood of well-formulated arguments. The problem is that the pamphlet format is conducive to gross gaps in reasoning and in the selection and treatment of source material.



A lot of the arguments in the book are based on interviews with various people. But some of them feel their statements were taken out of context and do not reflect what they really meant to say.

One of them is one of Myhrberg's major witnesses in the U-137 argument, namely the journalist who called the Karlskrona Coast Guard on the evening of 27 October, before the submarine ran aground, to report hearing strange engine noises. This witness was the starting point for Myhrberg's contention that the sub had its diesel engines running. This person now says that Myhrberg edited his account of the interview. The strange noise he heard was an alternately rising and falling sound from what seemed to be a fixed source, somewhat resembling the sound of a car skidding on ice.

In other words it was not the normal sound of a passing vessel. And this person volunteered the information that in quoting him Myhrberg had put words in his mouth that he had not used.

Raising radical and awkward questions is very important in a debate that involves intricate problems of interpretation. But when the questions are raised using the kind of methods Myhrberg resorts to the result is not only useless but directly harmful to the debate.

It would undeniably improve Sweden's position and simplify the security policy debate if the submarine crisis could be dismissed as a kind of UFO hysteria or witch hunt, fanned by an enormous military conspiracy. But in the absence of evidence to support such an interpretation a number of difficult questions remain about Sweden's foreign relations and the country's strategic situation.

One of these questions concerns how to handle a situation involving continued violations. About 3 years ago, at the beginning of October 1982, I wrote a DAGENS NYHETER article in which I said that in light of the submarine violations Sweden should try to restore Soviet confidence in our neutrality policy in order to eliminate the political basis for continued violations, along with taking military steps. It can be noted today that the submarine intrusions turned out to be a more complicated phenomenon to deal with.

It is not hard to demonstrate on an overall neutrality policy level the importance of smoothly functioning relations between Sweden and the Soviet Union. But at the same time this involves a risk of "normalizing the abnormal," thus maneuvering Sweden into a position in which continued submarine violations are accepted in practice. The politically restraining factors in such a development would affect us more than the Soviet Union, which could show good faith by admitting an unintentional violation of air space without allowing this to affect its deliberate activities.

This would not be normalization in the true sense of the word but a return in all respects to the situation prior to October 1981, with good working relations between the countries and a constant but inconspicuous military activity in Swedish waters.

The key to this problem apparently lies in the other big question, namely the question concerning the background and meaning of the submarine violations. The unspoken premise for Swedish policy so far has been that the violations represent a relatively marginal activity that can be stopped by a combination of increasing the military risks involved and exercising political restraint. If this line does not work it suggests that the violations are more serious or, more likely, that they are part of a larger phenomenon. Trying to clarify this must be regarded as one of the most important tasks in the Swedish security policy debate today.

6578

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ECONOMIC

BELGIUM

#### STUDY ON PROBLEMS OF ENTREPRENEURS

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 14 Aug 85 p 35

[Commentary by Tony Vandeputte, general advisor and director for economic affairs of the Federation of Belgian Enterprises: "The Belgian Entrepreneur in 1985" - from the results of an inquiry]

[Text] Although there is always much discussion on the enterprise, the entrepreneur himself is almost always an unknown. Therefore the Federation of Belgian Enterprises has recently conducted an inquiry among a number of leaders of different size enterprises, as well as among founders of new companies.

The young founder of a new enterprise is on the average between 29 and 39 years of age. His level of education is not particularly high compared to that of leaders of large enterprises. Just as in other countries, youths in Belgium are apt to start their own business primarily through a desire to work according to personal judgments. Dissatisfaction with the wage earner's situation and necessity--dismissal, unemployment--are very far behind as motives for founding an enterprise.

Respect, prestige, the wielding of authority and the financial aspect play a role but are generally seen as a sort of recognition for the efforts expended and for the number of hours put in, rather than as motives for setting up a business. It is also striking that both in the inquiry of the VBO [Federation of Belgian Enterprises] and in Belgian and foreign studies it was ascertained that the region where one lives and the reaction of family and relatives are extremely important factors in the decision to found an enterprise. And, finally, there is also the general economic, social and fiscal climate.

It is very clear from the inquiry that the greatest obstacle to founding a business is the number of administrative formalities. Following that are the financing problems, although at quite a distance. In order to learn a little more about the types of administrative problems, we submitted a number of answers to the enterprises. Almost 38 percent stated that far too little information is given on aid to new enterprises. Twenty seven percent stressed general administrative formalities, and 20 percent the slowness with respect to the registration and publication of the deed of establishment.

Besides these two difficulties (formalities and financing) there is a third one which shows up in our inquiry, but which is primarily emphasized in foreign studies. It concerns the gaps in training, especially in the area of management.

The VBO inquiry shows that young entrepreneurs often have an inadequate knowledge of finances and marketing. They don't always draw up a clear plan of the development of the company. Often they do not use the available time in a correct manner because they are too interested in certain facets of the enterprise at the expense of others. They are not always capable of making a good choice of associates, giving them appropriate guidance, and retaining them.

Most large and small enterprises want to grow as much as possible. That is likewise true of new enterprises, although to a smaller extent. The attitude of the large and medium-sized companies generally has a voluntaristic aspect. They want to grow because that is characteristic of the enterprise, because the market offers the opportunity and, in the case of large enterprises, because they want to support export and promote work opportunity in this manner.

New enterprises appear to be influenced to a greater degree by the evolution of the market, and they attach more importance to the income- and profit aspect related to growth, perhaps because this is their main financing source. As to obstacles to growth, the inquiry cites, for all types of enterprises, the extreme fiscal pressure in all its forms. Primarily large enterprises also add to that the economic policy of the government.

Although all enterprises are sensitive to the high costs of the labor factor, this appears to be especially the case for new companies. It is also interesting that many leaders of small and new companies see in growth a danger for their control over the business. They fear that events might overwhelm them and that they will no longer be able to cope with the problems.

As to growth, it should be noted that large enterprises resort to the new management techniques which grant more autonomy to certain departments of the company which one wants to encourage especially. What also shows up in the inquiry is the desire of small and, especially, new enterprises to be able to count on the cooperation of large enterprises for their growth.

Most enterprises are going to invest primarily in Belgium because here there are still opportunities, and because they don't have faith in foreign markets they don't know well. Hence it is almost solely large enterprises which invest abroad, because they are of the opinion that opportunities for growth are better there, and that it will cost less than expanding in our country.

All enterprises, regardless of size, mention as their biggest advantage the quality of their associates. The large companies also see their market knowledge and financial structure as positive points, while the small ones put more emphasis on customer service and, as in the case of new enterprises, on their ability to adapt to the demand flexibly. In our inquiry, research was cited as an advantage only by large companies.



Enterprises request support primarily from financial institutions. Large companies often work together with universities, and all enterprises often make an appeal to trade federations.

The decision to establish an enterprise depends primarily on the personal characteristics of the future business manager. It is primarily his urge for independence and his desire to achieve something which motivate him.

8700

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ECONOMIC

NETHERLANDS

# FNV'S PONT PREDICTS DIFFICULTIES WITH LABOR PARTY

Rotterdam HET VRIJE VOLK in Dutch 21 Aug 85 p 4

[Report on interview with FNV (Netherlands Trade Unions Federation) Leader Pont by Peter van Eijkelenburg and Yvonne Zonderop: "Pont Predicts 'Vigorous Confrontation with PvdA (Labor Party)'" ; date not given]

[Text] Is everything hunky-dory--nothing wrong at all with the relations between the FNV and the Labor Party?

The first reactions to the recently published PvdA election program perhaps created that impression. The largest trade federation and the largest political party were thought to be in favor of the same policy. Even though it doesn't call it an election advise, the FNV would definitely urge its members to give their vote to "list 1" next year, it appeared.

Incoming FNV Chairman Hans Pont nevertheless frowns deeply when we ask him for a detailed commentary on the PvdA plans. He expects a "rather vigorous confrontation" if the PvdA insists on its plans with respect to shortening of the work week. The 32-hour work week in 1990 is a commendable endeavor which is shared by the FNV. But the manner in which the social democrats plan to materialize it goes very much against the grain of the trade federation.

"The PvdA expects wage earners to sacrifice any potential wage increase in favor of shortening the work week. Only half of the jobs which open up in that manner must be reoccupied. The other half is "left" with the company. The wage earners pay part of their wages back to the company because the PvdA wants to eliminate government subsidies to industry.

"For us that issue is a matter of principle. In our opinion, the shorter work week must be 'expense-neutral' as it is called. All the income that is sacrificed must be converted into work. Neither companies nor wage earners need to make profit on that. Therefore the FNV counts on a reoccupation rate of 70 percent instead of the 50 percent the PvdA is thinking of. That is very important to us."

[Question] A high rate of reoccupation sounds good, but the Central Planning Bureau rejects that as completely unrealistic.

[Answer] "I am aware of that. But the Central Planning Bureau also finds it unrealistic that wage earners want to go ahead with the ATV [shortening of the work week] I admit that the experiences so far have only yielded a meager result. But that is because all sorts of problems had to be overcome first. The phase of overcapacity in large parts of industry now is behind us. Now ATV should start leading toward a high rate of reoccupation. That is also the reason why employers resist it so strongly. Now that it yields less money, some of them have lost interest already, whereas we are just starting to be interested, for finally it produces work opportunity.

"It is precisely one of the strong points that the ATV doesn't yield profit to anyone. We say that to employers: there is no extra expense involved for you. We must be able to say the same thing to our members. They want to see the result of their compliance. If the operation turns out to be favorable to the boss, I don't see the 32-hour work week coming into being yet. You must not let people pay more than what it costs. Therefore we say: 70 percent reoccupation, and utilize the rest for financing VUT [early retirement] regulations and the like."

[Question] Thus you do take the position that the members should sacrifice their wage increase for 4 years for their unemployed neighbor. Are they really willing to do that?

[Answer] "That depends entirely on the faith they have in our program. We have drawn up a guideline in which we strive for the 32-hour work week by 1990. On the basis of that, the labor conditions policy is established. From year to year the discussion will take place on how the shortening of the work week should develop.

"Look, the degree to which members remain enthusiastic primarily depends on the result, the high rate of reoccupation. If too few new jobs result, it will become very difficult to keep spirits up. Then one would prefer to opt for wage improvement. Therefore that 50 percent reoccupation planned by the PvdA is much too low. It won't work."

#### 2.5 Percent Growth

[Question] The PvdA uses the money of the wage earners to eliminate subsidies to industry. Through that, other money becomes available, with which the PvdA finances good intentions. Recovery of the coupling, an increase in benefits, a recovery of purchasing power for the minimum incomes. According to the FNV that is an impossible road to go. Which of those plans should the PvdA forget about?

[Answer] "Let's leave that up to the Labor Party."

[Question] Isn't the FNV interested in those plans?

[Answer] "Yes indeed, and they also appear in our own program. But we start from the premise that the economy has an annual growth of 2.5 percent. The PvdA works with 2 percent. We think that that is on the low side. And so it should be if one intends to have achieved the 32-hour work week by 1990. But

we use the formula that the work week shortening should take place with the retention of "at least" the purchasing power. Thus that offers a little room for improvement of the purchasing power. If that does not succeed, the 32 hours can certainly not be achieved. Our little calculation reads: an annual wage latitude of 2.5 percent, of which 1.5 percent is utilized for work week shortening. Then 1 percent remains for other matters, such as the purchasing power or an increase in benefits."

[Question] An increase in benefits, just as recovery of the coupling, is an important issue for the PvdA. The PvdA does, however, take the position that wage earners won't make wage demands, so that the coupling with benefits remains affordable. What should be done if wage earners still make wage demands?

[Answer] "If there is a danger that benefits will stay behind, the government should intervene with the tax- and premium instrument. Then wage earners have to sacrifice their wage again in the form of higher premiums. That would be a good point for discussion with us. Equal treatment of wage earners and those entitled to benefits is one of our motives for the work week shortening. It's better to sacrifice a wage increase in order to create work than to pump it into unemployment through premiums. The alternative is that you give in to a permanent shifting of the problems onto the unemployed. We don't believe in that."

[Question] The PvdA thinks that the government has a responsibility of its own if the social partners don't succeed in bringing about the shorter work week. Doesn't that resemble threatening with legal steps, to which the FNV is so opposed?

[Answer] "Indeed, that's what it looks like, but one shouldn't take that so seriously. If you get saddled with great structural unemployment, and if employers and wage earners don't appear to be able to do anything about it, then the government has a right, or perhaps even a duty, to intervene. We are not in favor of a coercive government, but of a helpful one. However, in times of need the government has the final responsibility. Then the government must intervene. For example, in case the employers remain opposed to the ATV without any reason. If they can prove that ATV is not possible in a certain branch of industry because no new workers can be found, intervention is not necessary. Then it is a matter of a training problem which must be tackled. But if it is really unwillingness on the part of employers, then it is a different matter. I don't think, however, that that is the case for our employers."

Unsocial

"The PvdA knows very well, of course, that we don't want an imposed shorter work week, because we find that interfering with our freedom of negotiation. Moreover, we don't see how that would be possible. How in heaven's name can one regulate by law how many new workers should come into a company as a result of the shorter work period? No, I remain with my standpoint that if employers don't have sound arguments against the ATV, we can conclude good agreements with them on the shorter work week and that the government only has



to help. If it is significant unwillingness of the employers, then that is simply unsocial behavior. But you must not assume that in advance--anyway, I don't do that."

[Question] But aren't there enough indications that employers don't want the shortening of the work week?

[Answer] "Haven't we already been able to conclude some agreements with them? And where it did not succeed in the CAO's [Collective Labor Agreements], we have appointments everywhere to study the special problem areas connected to the ATV. So far, we have not been adequately successful."

[Question] Employers often say that their employees don't want to work a shorter work week.

[Answer] "At times you hear a tendency among employers that they don't find the great unemployment so terrible, because then they have too much choice when there is a vacancy. That opens the door for the situation in which they are left with a nucleus of skilled people who are certain of keeping their jobs, full time positions with good pay. And around them a large group of workers of a lower rank, who can easily be taken into the company or let go--people who can easily be eliminated. At times you hear that said. But when I talk with employers myself, I notice that it is not a general tendency, and that they are sorry that this idea has taken root. I won't generalize about the standpoints of employers, their views are too varied for that. But if it should indeed become the trend, then we would have serious conflicts with them, for a society with two types of employers is not what we have in mind."

#### Solidarity

[Question] The purchasing power of the wage earners appears to be higher in the case of continuing the policy of the current cabinet than in the case of a PvdA cabinet. Should FNV members still be happy with the PvdA?

[Answer] "Surely that applies only to people who are still employed. It is a matter of solidarity, but also of self-interest. This cabinet wants more purchasing power for wage earners, in a social security system which is worse than before. That will hurt the wage earner at the moment he has to start living on benefits. Everyone wants more money, of course, but the price we are paying for that now is too high. It is never in the interest of wage earners to dismantle a good social security system. And indeed, our members don't want that; that is clear from the polls we have conducted. A good social system also is purchasing power, sometimes for others, but also for yourself when you become dependent on social benefits."

#### Shift

[Question] According to the FNV, and also the PvdA, there will be 500,000 unemployed in 1990. But the current cabinet says: if we can continue with our policy, unemployment will have decreased to 500,000 by 1990. So what exactly should an FNV member put in the ballot box shortly?

[Answer] "Even assuming that that would be true if the cabinet policy were continued, the policy we propose is still better, for it meets certain social demands. That should have preference over the non-solidary manner proposed by the cabinet, namely increasing the economic growth and decreasing unemployment at the expense of those entitled to benefits. To purposely shift all the expense onto those groups of people is something we definitely do not want."

#### Blackmail

[Question] The CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] is willing to leave more matters up to the social partners than the PvdA is. The CDA also wants to make the coupling and civil servant salaries dependent on what happens in industry. Is that no longer attractive to the FNV?

[Answer] "That is a little blackmail, of course. Then they say: the purchasing power of civil servants will be retained. But if wages in companies increase, the market sector will be blamed for the government personnel remaining behind in wages. That also would apply to the minimum wage earners and those entitled to benefits.

"That is not correct, that is almost a wage measure. The government ought to lay the foundation for an effective social security with equal rights, thus applicable to everyone. If you leave it up to industry, the level of a particular benefit depends on the economic strength of a branch of industry and on the strength of the union which can be summoned in that branch of industry.

"Then you get a situation of unequal rights between the disabled and unemployed from various branches of industry. That is now the case with pensions: some people have to make do with their little AOW [Old Age] pension, and others have a supplemental pension. That is a messy situation. We now have order in social security, we must not turn it into chaos. Thus it should be done properly; it should be regulated by law."

8700

CSO: 3614/141

ECONOMIC

SWEDEN

## BUYING POWER FOR ALMOST ALL WORKERS DROPPED 1975-1983

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Sep 85 p 12

[Article by Clas Barkman]

[Excerpt] Buying power fell dramatically for almost all wage earners in the period between 1975 and 1983. In 1984 it rose again, mainly for salaried employees in the private sector.

By and large those who had the highest and lowest wages 10 years ago are in the same situation today. At the top are engineers and job supervisors. Nurse's assistants are at the bottom. Wage relationships between all groups seem to be firmly set.

The Central Bureau of Statistics, SCB, provided these figures at DAGENS NYHETER's request. In all, 20 occupations were studied. Half are in the private sector and half in the public sector.

In all cases gross wages (wages before tax deductions) were determined. All figures were converted to 1984 currency values so that buying power in various years could be compared.

### Drop in Buying Power

The study showed that buying power declined for almost all wage groups in the period between 1975 and 1983. Guarantee regulations and compliance clauses have lured wage earners into a long chase.

SCB's calculations show that salaried employees in the private sector (PTK [Negotiating Cartel for Salaried Employees in the Private Sector]) were the first to get pay increases in what was later called the wage explosion of the 1970's.

The top year for salaried employees in private industry was 1975. The year after that industrial workers in the private sector followed the lead of the salaried employees. That year, 1976, was the peak year for industrial workers' wages. It was not until 1977 that public employees received extra pay increases. Secondary school teachers, for example, shot up to the top of the wage scale in 1977, according to the SCB figures.

The peak year as far as buying power is concerned for those working for the state and municipalities was also 1977. In contrast to private employees these groups in the public sector did not get any help from market forces. Instead it was the compliance regulations in the contracts that pulled public wages up in response to wage increases in the private sector.

The record years in the mid-1970's, when almost all wage earners received their top wages, are now considered a disaster for the national economy, since the wage increases fueled inflation.

Today--after all the Rosenbad meetings with the government and others--almost all the union organizations have agreed to avoid repeating the "mistake" of the wage explosion. Today they are aiming at low wage increases and low inflation rates in the future.

#### Showing the Way

The SCB figures show that even now it is salaried employees in the private sector who go ahead and show the way for other wage groups by pushing up wages. Since PTK can be said to guide wage developments, they no longer need any compliance rules in their contracts. As was the case in 1975 workers in the private sector and then public employees follow along in the wage developments for salaried employees.

The extent to which buying power will increase this time depends upon a number of factors. The government is expected to invite the factions on the labor market very soon to hold more friendly talks on holding down wages and inflation--although the meetings will not be held at Rosenbad this time. LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] has already accepted an invitation, but both TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees] and the employers have shown some reluctance. Market developments are another influential factor.


A decrease in orders received by businesses also reduces labor demands for certain groups. This can result in less wage drift, in other words wage increments in addition to those agreed on in contracts, in the future.

The SCB study clearly indicates that the relationship between wages for various groups is very stable. Over a period of 10 years the standings have changed only slightly.

For example industrial workers in engineering industries ranked between 14 and 16 on the list of 20 occupations selected for the study. It is this position that the Metalworkers' Union would now like to change.

At the Metalworkers' Union congress at the beginning of September the union decided to ask for a larger share of the wage increases than other groups will receive next year. The goal is to move up on the wage scale. The argument of the Metalworkers' Union is that industrial workers have dirtier, harder and more dangerous jobs than other groups of wage earners.

Månadslön (1)  
i kr i 1984 års  
penningvärde



The diagram shows wage development for five job categories for the period from 1975 to 1984. It is obvious that the different occupations indicate the same trend and that the groups with the highest and lowest wages today were in the same position 10 years ago.

Key:

- |   |                       |
|---|-----------------------|
| 1. Monthly wages in terms of 1984 currency values | 4. Painters           |
| 2. Secondary school teachers                      | 5. Industrial workers |
| 3. Engineers, designers                           | 6. Nurse's assistants |



## Rigidity

The Metalworkers' Union can count on getting some help from market forces when it comes to skilled workers--since there is a shortage in this area today. Individual engineering industries will go along with inflated wage scales in order to attract skilled workers in the field. The employers are not very interested in unskilled workers.

But the stability or rigidity in the wage rankings indicates that it might be very hard for the Metalworkers' Union to move its members up past graphics workers, papermill workers and salaried employees.

There have already been loud protests against this union's ambitions from those receiving lower wages than metalworkers: Sigvard Marjasin, chairman of the Municipal Workers' Union, said that the Metalworkers' Union's demands are "egocentric." Nurse's assistants, who received the lowest wages during the entire period studied by SCB, are included in the Municipal Workers' Union.

No one knows for sure who established the wage order of the occupational groups. Union organizations would like to think that this is the result of deliberate distribution policy choices during wage negotiations. Employers point to market forces, in other words supply and demand where labor is concerned.

6578

CS0: 3650/4

ENERGY

FINLAND

## PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO NEW NUCLEAR PLANT SEEN ON DECLINE

### MP Support for New Nuclear Plant

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Sep 85 p 7

[Text] Oulu (HS)—Over a third of the members of Parliament, 72 representatives, are defending construction of a fifth nuclear power plant. One less than that number, 71, are against it. A fourth of them have not yet stated their position on it or do not want to declare it.

The Oulu newspaper LIITTO (Center Party) has polled all the members of Parliament. The paper gathered opinions on a nuclear power plant during the summer and published them on Saturday.

The Conservative parliamentary delegation is most explicit in assuming a position on a new nuclear power plant. Most of the Center Party (KEPU) delegation, the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] and representatives of the small parties declared themselves opposed to it.

There are almost as many supporters as opponents of it in both the SDP [Social Democratic Party] and the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League]. Most of them, that is, 26 Social Democrats, do not, however, want to reveal their opinions.

Opposition to a nuclear power plant clearly seems to have decreased in comparison with a similar poll conducted after the last parliamentary elections. Two years ago nearly half of Parliament assumed a negative position on it and at that time there were noticeably fewer favorable positions on it than now.

### Only Two Against It in the Conservative Party

Thirty-six Conservative members of Parliament, fully over 80 percent, support construction of a new nuclear power plant. Only Sirpa Pietikainen and Jouni J. Sarkijarvi declared themselves to be opposed to it.

Ilkka Kanerva, Ritva Laurila, Erkki Moisander, Eva-Riitta Siitonen and Riitta Uosukainen did not want to assume a position on the matter. Pertti Salolainen announced that he was in principle in favor of it.

### 31 Social Democrats Did Not Assume a Position

Over half of the Social Democrats, 31 members of Parliament, did not yet want to announce their positions. Among them are, among others, Environment Minister Matti Ahde, Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine and Education Minister Kaarina Suonio. Both Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa and party secretary Erkki Liikanen felt that the LIITTO poll was unwarranted at this point.

Fourteen Social Democrats were supporters of nuclear power and almost the same number, 13, were strong opponents of it.

Most of the KEPU members of Parliament, 19 representatives, are against a new nuclear power plant. Among them is Social Welfare and Health Minister Eva Kuuskoski-Vikatmaa. A fourth of the party's parliamentary representatives support a power plant. Among others, Defense Minister Veikko Pihlajamäki announced that he was in favor of it.

### Vayrynen's Position Is Open Too

Seven KEPU members of Parliament have not yet formed a clearcut opinion on a new nuclear power plant. Neither Finance Minister Ahti Pekkala nor Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen wants to make a final decision on his opinion.

### Ranks of SKDL Also Divided

Opinions are divided in the SKDL in the same way as in the SDP too. Ten members of Parliament, among them moderates as well as Stalinists, support a new power plant; there are 12 opponents, the most conspicuous figure among whom is the new SKDL chairman, Esko Helle.

Of the SKDL representatives, Irma Rosnell, Veikko Saarto, Marja-Liisa Salminen and Osmo Vepsäläinen did not specify their positions.

With one exception, the SMP's parliamentary delegation stands in the ranks of the opponents. Only Mikko Vainio did not yet want to definitively declare his position, although he did state that it will probably be a negative one.

### RKP Delegation Undecided

Most of the RKP [Swedish People's Party] delegation are still undecided and did not want to express an opinion. Three oppose nuclear power. Only Jutta Zilliacus is in favor of it. Justice Minister Christoffer Taxell did not consent to respond to the newspaper's question.

The Christian Leaguers, the Greens, independent Liisa Kulhia and Georg C. Ehrnrooth of the Constitutional People's Party opposed a fifth nuclear power plant.

Parties Avoid Stating Positions

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 8 Sep 85 p 7

[Article by Jouni Tervo]

[Text] It is just as hard for the parties to assume a clear position on nuclear power and whether to build a new nuclear power plant or not as it is for many of their parliamentary representatives. Most of the parties have avoided specifying their final positions and wisely taken care not to get their fingers burned.

The limit to deliberation is, however, indisputably approaching. The government has announced that it will begin discussion of solutions to the energy problem for the next decade this fall, provided that the government's budget for next year has been submitted to Parliament.

SMP Is Opposed to It

The SMP has expressed the most absolute position. It declared itself to be opposed to nuclear power in particular, but also in general to all solutions that would mean the construction of a new power plant.

The SMP last presented its views without discord in early August at its party congress in Hyvinkaa. According to chairman Pekka Vennamo, the SMP is in sympathy with the idea of decentralized energy production and of increasing domestic production of energy. In practice this could mean, for example, the production of electricity by means of small, peat-burning power plants.

So Far KEPU Is Opposed to It

The KEPU has also declared itself to be opposed to nuclear power — at least so far. The anti-nuclear power position adopted over a year ago in Savonlinna, which some people in the KEPU have quietly been trying to make less binding, is binding on the party.

Party secretary Seppo Kaariainen, to be sure, firmly denies that the sled is being turned around, but he nevertheless admits that the rank and file's uncompromising attitude is in part weakening.

Last summer chairman Paavo Vayrynen hastened to demand a free hand for the [party's] parliamentary representatives in reaching a final decision on nuclear energy.

In the KEPU they have sharply criticized Social Democratic Trade and Industry Minister Seppo Lindblom's deliberate sluggishness in the handling of energy matters.

In Kaariainen's opinion, Lindblom, who has declared himself to be a willing supporter of nuclear power, is in this way supporting the aims of the power companies. An effort has not been made to control electricity consumption



either, because high consumption provides the weapons to demand greater production with a big nuclear power plant, Kaariainen suspects.

In the opinion of the KEPU, the first thing to be studied should be the possibilities for economizing electricity. Restrictions on the use of present-day so-called direct electric heating in private homes were raised as an example.

If the KEPU were able to decide on energy matters alone, it would strew small power plants all over the country — it is on its guard against the idea of concentrated big power plants.

#### Conservative Party Supports It

The Conservative Party is the third of the parties marketing a ready-made opinion. Differing from the above-mentioned ones, it is solidly entrenched behind nuclear power.

Right away, in his first sentence, chairman Ilkka Suominen said that the decision on a nuclear power plant was now over a year late. In support of his words he dropped a bunch of new-sounding statistics.

According to Suominen, the same amount of electricity a year that economic analysts have calculated will be used during the beginning of the next decade is already being consumed in Finland. In addition, in his opinion, preservation of Finland's self-sufficiency will require an increase in nuclear power.

According to Suominen, the more extensively the energy question is studied the more overwhelming is the case for nuclear power as an alternative. In his arguments he regularly remembers to stress the pollution-free aspect of nuclear power as compared with competing forms of energy, primarily coal and peat.

While nuclear power is very highly favored in the Conservative Party, it is not completely unopposed. The most conspicuous opponent of nuclear energy is Jouni J. Sarkijarvi, who was promoted to become party vice chairman in June.

#### SDP Has No Opinion

Opinions on the nuclear energy issue are at odds with one another in the worst way in the parties of the Left. Particularly the SDP is blundering in a conspicuous way.

The Social Democrats have not assumed a position for or against it, rather the party is appealing to the need for more reports. The official position is probably very close to party secretary Erkki Liikanen's statement: "We are critical of all the alternatives."

There is no clearcut configuration inside the SDP. The likely division in energy issues will probably follow the principles of a big party: In the case of a conflict they are once again "administration of the state" and "idealism."



Those who have adopted a position that most strongly opposes nuclear power are in the party's so-called left wing, which had even before struggled against the mainstream.

The party leaders and ministers qualify their statements very diplomatically. Of the ministers, Seppo Lindblom has clearly defined his position. He supports a new nuclear power plant.

SKDL: Yes and No

The SKDL has the same sorts of problems as the Social Democrats: Obtaining a clearcut, common opinion produces great difficulties. The SKDL has, however, generally expressed noticeably more critical opinions of nuclear energy than the Social Democrats.

Among other things, the party's new chairman, Esko Helle, complains that in making decisions we have to rely too much on information that is sweet music to the ears of the power companies. He himself would favor economizing and decentralizing energy production rather than nuclear power.

The Communists, on the other hand, as early as a couple of years ago announced that they supported construction of a new nuclear power plant provided that it was ordered from the Soviet Union.

RKP Wants a Debate

Of the small parties, RKP chairman Christoffer Taxell wants a broad, national debate before reaching decisions. In his own words, he has been setting it in motion with the Greens.

So far the result has been profound silence. Could the reason be the lack of a common language or the fact that the RKP itself completely lacks an approach to the issue? Taxell, for example, answers all questions concerning nuclear power by saying: "I am not assuming a position."

A position must, however, be assumed, if possible before the end of the present election term. The nuclear energy bill that is right now being discussed in committee transfers the final power of decision for the construction of a nuclear power plant to Parliament. The government has furthermore promised to submit the issue of a fifth nuclear power plant to Parliament to decide on even though the new law will not yet be in effect at that time.

11,466

CSO: 3617/167

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

SWEDEN

PAPER LAUDS PALME DECISION TO SET UP ENVIRONMENT MINISTRY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Sep 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Environmental Affairs Ministry--a Welcome Move"]

[Text] Under pressure from women, young people and Christians in the movement, Olof Palme was forced to stress environmental issues in the campaign. Now he will appoint a minister of environmental affairs.

The basic idea is a good one. There is a need for a cabinet minister who can speak out for environmental interests. In deliberations that involve many vital interests environmental considerations tend to be overshadowed. They are bargained away by ministries that have their own special interests to consider. Not even the Agricultural Ministry, which deals with the most central environmental issues, has been able to represent them forcefully. The ministry is responsible for sectors that conflict with each other: the environment versus agriculture and forestry. But Agricultural Minister Svante Lundqvist has not been strong enough either. The government's concessions to the automobile industry with regard to purifying exhaust emissions and insisting on lead-free gasoline were revealing.

If an environmental affairs minister is to have any clout he must both have his own ministry with responsibility for environmental issues and a strong political position in his party and in the government. And a strong interest in the environment, of course. Otherwise the fears that Environmental Protection Agency chief Valfrid Paulsson expressed in DAGENS NYHETER on Tuesday will be realized and environmental issues will have an even weaker impact than they do now.

It would be reasonable to move the real environmental issues (acid rain, spraying, the use of poisons, etc.) to the new ministry from the Ministry of Agriculture and transfer national physical planning from the Housing Ministry (which could then be abolished). In addition the minister of environmental affairs should look after environmental aspects of many other issues, such as the job environment and energy policy. Anita Gradin's watchful role in issues involving equality can serve as a model.

There seems to be a big risk that Olof Palme will be content to appoint an environmental affairs minister within the Ministry of Agriculture. He is said to have indicated that all he needs is an alibi he can use to soothe environmentalists in his own party.